The Attack as Strong Negation, Part I by Gabbay, Dov & Gabbay, Michael
The Attack as Strong Negation, Part I
D. Gabbay
King’s College London,
Department of Informatics,
Strand, London, WC2R 2LS, UK;
Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
and
University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg.
dov.gabbay@kcl.ac.uk
M. Gabbay
Cambridge University, UK.
mg639@cam.ac.uk
Submitted to Logic Journal of the IGPL 1.4.15. Revised 1.6.15. Paper 540
Compiled on October 6, 2018
Abstract
We add strong negation N to classical logic and interpret the attack
relation of “x attacks y” in argumentation as (x → Ny). We write a
corresponding object level (using N only) classical theory for each ar-
gumentation network and show that the classical models of this theory
correspond exactly to the complete extensions of the argumentation net-
work. We show by example how this approach simplifies the study of
abstract argumentation networks. We compare with other translations
of abstract argumentation networks into logic, such as classical predicate
logic or modal logics, or logic programming, and we also compare with
Abstract Dialectical Frameworks.
1 Background from classical logic: non-logical
axiomatic theories
This paper introduces a particularly intuitive and simple representation/translation
of abstract argumentation networks into classical propositional logic. All we
need is a simple version of strong negation. So our starting point must be to
introduce this negation.
Classical propositional logic can be properly axiomatised in many ways. For
simplicity, let us take the set T of all tautologies as axioms and the rule of
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modus ponens as the deduction rule. Let us assume that the connectives used
are the usual ones {¬,∧,∨,→,⊥,>} and the atomic sentences are the set P =
{p1, p2, p3, . . .}. Classical logic is strongly complete for the classical semantics.
Models are assignments h giving values in {0, 1} to the atoms of P .
We have satisfaction defined as follows for wffs A and theories ∆.
• h  p iff h(p) = 1, for p ∈ P
• h  >
• h 6 ⊥
• h  ¬A iff h 6 A
• h  A ∧B iff h  A and h  B
• h  A ∨B iff h  A or h  B
• h  A→ B iff h  A implies h  B.
• h  ∆ iff h  A for all A ∈ ∆.
The notion of proof A1, . . . , An ` B can be defined in classical logic in many
ways and completeness holds for any set of wffs ∆ and any A:
• ∆ ` A iff for all models h we have h  ∆ implies h  A.
We now introduce the notion of a set of sentences being a specific non-logical
axiomatic theory Θn.
Consider again the set of atomic wff
P = {p1, p2, p3, . . .}.
Suppose we insist, for our own reasons, that we want to consider only those
models h satisfying the restriction (n) below:
(n) For all even index atoms p2, p4, p6, . . . , p2i, . . . we have h(p2i) = 1 implies
h(p2i−1) = 0, i = 1, 2, 3, . . .
There is a theory Θn of classical propositional logic whose models are exactly
all the models satisfying (n). This theory is
Θn = {p2 → ¬p1, p4 → ¬p3, p6 → ¬p5, . . .}
Let us now for the sake of clarity, rename the atoms of P with the help of a
new symbol N . We rename as follows:
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q1 = def. p1
Nq1 = def. p2
q2 = def. p3
Nq3 = def. p4
...
qi = def. p2i−1
Nqi = def. p2i
...
We can thus write the set of atoms as P as the set Q
Q = {q1, Nq1, q2, Nq2, . . .}.
The theory Θn becomes the theory
Θn = {Nq → ¬q|q ∈ {q1, q2, . . .}}
Θn is considered a non-logical set of axioms on the symbol N .
Note that N cannot be iterated and can be applied only to atoms taken from
{q1, q2, . . .}.
We said that we regard Θn as a non-logical axiomatic theory on the symbol
N . This is common practice in logic and model theory. Consider, for exam-
ple, the classical theory of Abelian groups formalised in classical logic for the
multiplication symbol ∗ and the constant 1. We add to the logical axioms of
predicate logic the non-logical group axioms below
• ∀xyz(x ∗ (y ∗ z) = (x ∗ y) ∗ z)
• ∀xy(x ∗ y = y ∗ x)
• ∀x(x ∗ 1 = x)
• ∀x∃y(x ∗ y = 1)
In our case our non-logical axioms are Θn = {Nq → ¬q}.
Thus our logic for N is a theory (of N) within classical propositional logic,
much in the same way as the theory of Abelian groups is a theory within the
classical predicate calculus. The next section defines the logic CN formally.
2 The logic CN
We add to classical propositional logic the strong negation symbol N . We can
thus form atomic sentences like {q1, . . . , qn, . . .} as well as atoms of the form
{Nq1, Nq2, . . .}. We do this as explained in Section 1.
At this point we do not allow iterations of N . We have the usual connectives
¬ (negation), ∧,∨,→,>,⊥. We shall discuss iterated use of N in a later section.
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We require the only additional non-logical axioms Θn = {Nq → ¬q}. We can
thus view Nq as strong negation. For example q might be true or q might be
false (i.e. ¬q is true) or q might be strongly false (Nq true) or q might be false
but not strongly false (¬q and ¬Nq true).
Let us define our logic directly.
Definition 2.1 (The CN classical propositional logic with atomic strong negation)
1. Let LN be a language with a set of atoms Q0 = {q1, q2, . . . , qn, . . .} and
the connectives {¬,∧,∨,→, N}. {¬,∧,∨,→} are the usual classical con-
nectives and N is a unary connective applied once to atoms only.
2. An atomic formula has the form q or Nq where q ∈ Q0.
3. A wff has the form A = atomic formula or A∧B,¬A,A∨B,A→ B where
A and B are wffs.
4. We regard as axioms for our logic CN the nonlogical set of axioms Θn as
discussed in Section 1. The proof theory CN is relying on the proof theory
of classical logic C, as follows:
• ∆ `CN A iff (def) ∆ ∪Θn `C A.
5. A model h for the logic CN is an assignment h giving each atomic wff of
the form q or Nq a value in {0, 1} such that if h(Nq) = 1 then h(q) = 0.
6. Satisfaction is defined in the usual way.
Theorem 2.2 CN is complete for the proposed semantics.
Proof. Our discussion in Section 1 presented CN as a non-logical theory Θn of
the classical propositional calculus of item 4 of Definition 2.1 defined the conse-
quence for CN, via the classical consequence. Since we have strong completeness
for C we also have it for CN. 
Remark 2.3 Note that what we are calling our ‘logic’ CN is actually a theory
in a two sorted classical propositional logic with two sorts of atoms of the form q
and Nq. In Appendix 10 we will turn our logic into a proper modal logic, which
we will call CNN.
We now have enough machinery to faithfully represent abstract argumentation
networks in the logic CN. This is the job of the next section.
3 Expressing argumentation networks in CN
This section will show a simple way of translating formal argumentation net-
works into CN. We assume we are dealing with finite argumentation networks.1
1Actually, we do not need the requirement that the network is finite. All we need is that it
is finitary, namely that each point is attacked by a finite number of attackers. This will allow
us to write classical wffs describing the attacks.
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We shall use the Caminada labelling characterisation of complete extensions.
See [1] for a survey. Given an argumentation network (S,R), with S 6= ∅ and
R ⊆ S × S, a legitimate Caminada labelling λ on S is a function λ : S 7→
{in, out, und} giving values “in”, “out”, “undecided” to each x ∈ S, satisfying
the following properties.
(C1) λ(x) = in iff either ¬∃y(yRx) or ∀y(yRx→ λ(y) = out).
(C2) λ(x) = out iff ∃y(yRx ∧ λ(y) = in)
(C3) λ(x) = und iff ∀y(yRx→ λ(y) 6= in) and ∃y(yRx ∧ λ(y) = und).
Each legitimate Caminada labelling gives rise to a unique complete extension
and all complete extensions can be obtained in this way. See [1].
Definition 3.1 Let A = (S,R) be a formal argumentation network which is
finitary, i.e. each point has a finite number of attackers This means that S 6= ∅
and R ⊆ S × S is the attack relation. Define a theory ∆A of the logic CN as
follows
1. We can assume that S ⊆ Q (i.e. the arguments of S are identified as
atoms of the logic).
2. ∆A = {x|¬∃y(yRx)}∪{y ↔
∧
z∈ Attack (y)Nz|y ∈ S}∪{z → Ny|zRy}∪
{(∧
z∈ Attack(y) ¬z) ∧ (
∨
z∈ Attack(y) ¬Nz)) → ¬y ∧ ¬Ny|y ∈ S}, where
Attack(y) = {z|zRy}.
Theorem 3.2 (First Correspondence Theorem) Let A = (S,R). Then
the models of ∆A correspond exactly to the complete extensions of A.
Proof.
1. Let h be a model of ∆A. We show it defines a complete extension on A
(note that two different models can yield the same complete extension):
We use the Caminada labelling function. Let x ∈ S. Define
λh(x) =
 in, if h(x) = 1out, if h(Nx) = 1
und, if h(x) = h(Nx) = 0
we prove the following
(a) λh is well defined. For each x we can have exactly one of the three
cases mentioned in the definition of λh. The reason for that is that
we have the axiom Nq → ¬q and so the case h(x) = 1 and h(Nx) = 1
does not arise.
(b) The crucial points to show are
i. If x is not attacked then λh(x) = in. This holds because x ∈ ∆A.
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ii. If zRy and λh(z) = in then h(z) = 1. Therefore h(Ny) = 1
(because z → Ny is in the theory) and so λh(y) = out.
iii. Suppose for all z such that zRy we have λh(z) = out. We want
to show the λh(y) = in. We have for all z such that zRy that
h(Nz) = 1 hence h(
∧
zRy Nz) = 1 and therefore h(y) = 1 (be-
cause of the theory), and so λh(y) = in.
iv. Suppose λh(y) = und. Then h(y) = h(Ny) = 0. Let zRy. We
cannot have λh(z) = in because then h(z) = 1 and this implies
h(Ny) = 1. Thus none of the attackers z of y are in. Thus for all
z such that zRy we have h(z) = 0. Can we have that for all of
such z, h(Nz) = 1? If this were the case, since y ↔ ∧zRy Nz is in
∆A we get h(y) = 1 i.e. λh(y) = in, contradicting our assumption
that λh(y) = und.
Therefore for some z such that zRy we have h(Nz) = 0. But
this means that λh(z) = und. We thus got that if λh(y) = und
then none of the attackers z of y are in and at least one of them
is undecided.
v. If λh(y) =out, (i.e. h(Ny) = 1), show that for some z such that
zRy , we have λh(z) =in, (i.e. h(z) = 1). Otherwise for all z
such that zRy, we have h(z) = 0. We ask about any such z, is
h(Nz) = 1? If the answer is yes for all of them then we must have
h(y) = 1, by item (iii) above. So for some z we have h(Nz) = 0.
Then by the axiom
∧
z∈ Attack(y) ¬z)∧(
∨
z∈ Attack(y) ¬Nz))→
¬y ∧ ¬Ny we get that h(Ny) = 0.
Either way, the assumption that for all z such that zRy we have
h(z) = 0, leads to a contradiction.
Thus λh is a legitimate labelling, giving rise to a complete extension.
2. Let λ be a legitimate labelling giving rise to a complete extension. We
show that it gives a model for ∆A.
Define hλ as follows:
hλ(x) = 1 if λ(x) = in
hλ(Nx) = 1 if λ(x) = out.
We show that all axioms of ∆A hold
(a) Show that hλ  Nx → ¬x otherwise hλ(Nx) = hλ(x) = 1. This
means that λ(x) = out and λ(x) = in which is not possible.
(b) Second we show that if zRy then hλ  z → Ny. Otherwise we have
hλ(z) = 1 and hλ(Ny) = 0. The former implies λ(z) = in. Therefore
λ(y)− out and so by definition hλ(Ny) = 1, a contradiction.
(c) We now show that
hλ  y ↔
∧
zRy
Nz.
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xFigure 1:
Assume hλ(y) = 1. Then λ(y) = in. So for all z such that zRy, λ(z) =
out, and so by definition of hλ, for all such z, hλ(Nz) = 1 and hence
hλ(
∧
zRy Nz) = 1.
Assume hλ(y) = 0. Therefore λ(y) 6= in. Then either λ(y) = out or
λ(y) = und. If λ(y) = out then for some z such that zRy we have
λ(z) = in. Therefore λ(z) 6= out and so hλ(Nz) = 0.
If λ(y) = und, then for some z, zRy an λ(z) = und again λ(z) 6= out
and so hλ(Nz) = 0.
Thus for sure if hλ(y) = 0 then for some z, zRy and hλ(Nz) = 0 and
so hλ(
∧
zRy Nz) = 0.
(d) We show that hλ 
∧
z∈ Attack(y) ¬z) ∧ (
∨
z∈ Attack(y) ¬Nz)) →
¬y ∧ ¬Ny. If the antecedent holds then all attackers of y are not in
and one of them is undecided. Therefore y is undecided and so the
consequent holds.

Corollary 3.3 Let A be an argumentation network. Consider ∆A. Then ∆A
is CN consistent.
Proof. Since A has the complete ground extension, by the previous Theorem
3.2 this yields a model for ∆A. 
Example 3.4 1. Consider the argumentation network of Figure 1.
Its theory in CN is ∆ = {x → Nx,Nx ↔ x,¬x ∧ ¬Nx → ¬x ∧ ¬Nx}.
Since we have the N axiom Nx→ ¬x we get that x→ ¬x is provable and
so ¬x is provable and so ¬Nx is also provable. This means we have only
one model h with h(x) = h(Nx) = 0 and therefore the only extension is
λ(x) = und.
2. Consider the additional axiom added to the theory Θn namely
Stable : {x ∨Nx|for all x}.
The theory Θn+ stable does not have models h in which h(x) = h(Nx) =
0 for any x. Thus this axiom characterises all stable extensions.
Theorem 3.5 Let A = (S,R) be an argumentation network. Consider ∆A and
let E = {x|∆A `CN x}. Then E is the ground extension of A.
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Proof. We know that ∆A is consistent. Hence E is consistent. We show that
E is a complete extension. Since other complete extension E′ corresponds to a
model of ∆A, E′ contains E. Thus E would be the smallest complete extension
— namely E is the ground extension. We now show that E is a complete
extension.
1. E is conflict free. Let x, y ∈ E. If xRy holds, then x → Ny ∈ ∆A and
hence ∆A `CN x → ¬y, which contradicts the consistency of ∆A since
∆A `CN y.
2. Assume E protects x. We show x ∈ E. Let zRx. then for some y ∈ E, yRz
holds. Hence y → Nz is in ∆A and so ∆A `CN Nz. Thus we have
∆A `CN
∧
zRx
Nz
and hence ∆A `CN x and so x ∈ E.

Remark 3.6 This is a clarifying remark about the correspondence between ex-
tensions of an argumentation network A = (S,R) and CN models of the theory
∆A.
Consider the three argumentation networks A1,A2,A3 in Figure 2. They all
have the same extension, x = in, y = out, z = in.
Their theories ∆Ai are different, but they have the same models.
∆A1 = {x, x→ Ny, y ↔ Nx, z,¬x ∧ ¬Nx→ ¬y ∧ ¬Ny}
∆A2 = {x, x→ Ny, y ↔ Nx, y → Nz, z ↔ Ny,
¬x ∧ ¬Nx→ ¬y ∧ ¬Ny,¬y ∧ ¬Ny → ¬z ∧ ¬Nz}
∆A3 = {x, x→ Ny, y ↔ Nx ∧Nz, x ∨ z → Ny,¬x ∧ ¬z∧
(¬Nx ∨ ¬Nz)→ ¬y ∧ ¬Ny, y → Nz, z → Ny,
¬y ∧ ¬Ny → ¬z ∧ ¬Nz,¬z ∧ ¬Nz → ¬y ∧ ¬Ny,
y ↔ Nz, z ↔ Ny}
All three theories have only one model h
x = 1, Nx = 0, y = 0, Ny = 1, z = 1, Nz = 0.
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The moral of the example is that the theories describe the extensions and not the
geometry of the networks. In fact, ∆Ai are all equivalent to ∆A = {x,¬Nx,¬y,Ny, z,¬Nz}.
Compare the CN approach with the truly meta-level approach of [1, Section
5], discussed below in the beginning of Section 5.
We describe (S,R) in predicate logic with unary predicates Q1(x) = x is
in, Q0(x) = x is out, and Q?(x) = x is und, and a relation xRy for attack.
Thus using R the networks of Figure 2 can be distinguished in the semantics.
Note, however, that we can read the geometry of the networks from the syntax
of the theories ∆Ai , i = 1, 2, 3, but not from their models! This highlights the
importance of proof theory.
Remark 3.7 The previous correspondence theorem reduces the idea of attack in
argumentation networks to the idea of strong negation in classical propositional
logic. This reduction simplifies every move we make in the argumentation area
and gives us a tremendous advantage in making available to us all the machinery
of classical logic. This includes
1. extensions for formal argumentations such as joint attacks, support, higher
level attacks, probabilistic argumentation, predicate/modal logic argumen-
tation and more, all can be done more simply and easily using strong
negation, see the following sections;
2. applications of argumentation become application of classical logic;
3. new ideas can be more readily imported from classical logic into argumen-
tation;
4. the Caminada labels, x is in, x is out and x is undecided are available
in the object language as x is true, Nx is true and ¬x ∧ ¬Nx is true,
respectively.
5. we now need to ask ourselves: what is the added value of argumentation
over classical logic? We need a clear and detailed answer to this question.
4 Intermediate critical evaluation
This section pauses our formal development to evaluate what we have so far
and to explain to the reader where we are going. We shall do this by a list of
critical comments.
CC1. Basing argumentation on the unary notion of “being
attacked”
We read Nx as “x is being attacked”, we are not saying how and from where this
attack comes. This makes Nx a kind of strong negation (with axiom Nx→ ¬x),
see [13]. This single simple idea allows us to have Theorem 3.2. It also allows
us to go in the direction of turning the system CN into a paraconsisent logic
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of negation (see Wikipedia) by adding axioms on iterating N (e.g. the axiom
NNx ↔ x). We can do this safely for as long as Theorem 3.2 is retained. We
shall address this direction in later sections. We believe we can achieve similar
results for logic programming by reading Nx as “x fails”. This direction, and
the connection with answer set programming, is left for a subsequent paper.
There is another direction we can go in. We can use another meaningful
logic such as intuitionistic logic, linear logic or relevance logic or fuzzy logic
to replace classical logic and thus get argumentation theory in those contexts.
Again we shall look at this in a subsequent paper.
CC2. Simple way of defining joint attacks
The theory ∆A written for an argumentation network A = (S,R) is comprised
of several components.
1. The logic CN (the use of N)
2. Formulas defining when an argument x is “in”.
This is the part
(Fin) x↔
∧
zRx
Nz
Fin also includes the part relating to “x is not attacked”, since the empty
conjunction is >.
3. Formulas defining when an argument x is “out”. This is the part z → Nx,
for all zRx, or if we write it as a single formula, it is Fout.
(Fout)
∨
zRx
z → Nx.
4. Formulas defining when x is undecided
(Fund) (
∧
z∈ Attack(x)
¬z) ∧ (
∨
z∈ Attack(x)
¬Nz)→ ¬x ∧ ¬Nx
Once we put the above in ∆A we get the correspondence theorem, Theo-
rem 3.2, generating complete extensions by models of ∆A.
Now we can see how easy it is to generalise argumentation to joint attacks.
Joint attacks, introduced in [3, 4] can be described by the configuration
in Figure 3 (using Gabbay’s notation from [3]).
The meaning is that we have x is out if all of z1, . . . , zn are in. This we
can write in our logic CN simply as
∧
(z1,...,zn)R0x
zi → Nx where R0 is
the joint attack relation of the form R0 ⊆ (2S −∅)× S.
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z1, zn
x
. . . ,
Figure 3:
So we can write the formula FJointout for joint attacks as
(FJointout ) (
∨
GR0x
∧
z∈G
z)→ Nx
where G ⊆ S, x ∈ S.
The formula for FJointout for a point x will be
(FJointin ) x↔ (
∧
GR0x
∨
z∈G
Nz)
(fJointund )
∧
GRox
(
∨
z∈G
¬z) ∧ (
∨
GR0x
∧
z∈G
(z ∨ ¬Nz))→ ¬x ∧ ¬Nx
If we use these three wffs FJointin and F
Joint
out and F
Joint
und to define ∆A, we can
study the semantics for joint attacks, in the object level, in classical logic
as models of ∆A, provided we prove a correspondence theorem similar to
Theorem 3.2.
The reader can compare the simplicity of this approach to what is done
in the papers [3, 4].
CC3. Simple way of defining higher level attacks
Higher level attacks on attacks. These were studied in many papers [2, 5, 6, 7, 9].
They were first introduced in general in Gabbay’s paper [8]. Figure 4 illustrates
the basic configuration for higher level attacks.
z attacks x and y attacks the attack z  x. We write it as y  (z  x).
We need to write the Fhigherin and F
higher
out and F
higher
und of this type of attack.
In our set up with N it is easy to write this! The Fout is z ∧Ny → Nx and the
Fin involves Nz∨y. Let us write the wff’s in detail for a network with one level
11
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Figure 4:
of higher attacks. So our networks have the form (S,R,R1), where R ⊆ S × S
are the attacks and R1 ⊆ S ×R are the attacks on the attacks. We write:
(Fhigherout ) (
∨
zRx
∧
yR1(z,x)
z ∧Ny)→ Nx
(Fhigherin )
∧
zRx
∨
yR1(z,x)
(Nz ∨ y))↔ x
(Fhigherund ) (¬
∧
zRx
∨
yR1(z,x)
(Nz ∨ y) ∧ ¬
∨
zRx
z ∧
∧
yR1(z,x)
Ny)→ ¬x ∧ ¬Nx
Again we use Fhighin , F
high
out and F
high
und to define ∆A, and let the semantics be
all CN models of ∆A. We need to prove a correspondence theorem similar to
Theorem 3.2.
CC4. A word of caution
Although we are showing how other types of networks can be translated into
CN, we are not just saying “look, our paper is introducing you to another
master generalisation of argumentation”. We reserve judgement about N until
the end of this paper and we might say at the end to the reader “in view of our
paper, do not think any more in the old conceptual framework of argumentation
of (S,R) but think in terms of strong negation N of just being attacked, and
do your argumentation from now on in classical logic with N”. The reason we
reserve judgement is because we want to figure out first how the use of N affects
related systems such as ABA (Assumption Based Argumentation, see [20]) and
ASPIC (see [21]). In ASPIC and ABA, the game is to start with a logic theory
∆, define proofs from ∆ as the argument set S, define a respective suitable
attack R between proofs, then define (S,R) as an instantiated network, take
extensions E ⊆ S and then make sure that E is consistent in the logic of ∆.
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This we perceive as a possibly unnecessary external detour. Our method might
say to ABA and ASPIC, “why do you need all this roundabout way involving
a multitude of problems? Why not add strong negation N directly to the logic
of ∆ and model your argumentation there and you are done? If CN can swing
this and we succeed in working out the details, then ABA and ASPIC would
immensely benefit from our conceptual view. See CC7 below.
CC5. Comparing with abstract dialectical framework (ADF)
ADF were introduced in [11] by Professor G. Brewka as a generalisation of
argumentation frameworks and immediately caused both excitement and criti-
cism. In this paper we shall use an example from Brewka’s slides [10] to do our
comparison.
An ADF has the form (S,R,C) where S is a set of arguments and R ⊆ S×S
is the link relation (Brewka calls them “links” because he does not view them
as attacks). C is a family of acceptance relations. For each x ∈ S, there is
a formula of classical propositional logic ϕx, specifying the acceptance (“in”)
condition for x, based on the acceptance values of {y|yRx}.
In our terms, as well as in classical logic terms, what ADF is saying is
condition FCin:
(FCin) x↔ ϕx, for all x ∈ S
If we regard FCin as a condition in our logic CN, then we can define all
complete extensions in our sense as all extensions obtained from models m of
∆C = (Θn + F
C
in), where the values {in, out, und} are as in the proof of part 1
of Theorem 3.2, namely:
• x = in if m(x) = 1
• x = out if m(Nx) = 1
• x = und if m(x) = m(Nx) = 0.
Brewka, however works only in classical proposition logic with the three
valued semantics according to Kleene. So his models give 3 values {1, 0, u} with
1 ∧ 1 = 1
0 ∧ 0 = 0
1 ∧ u = 0 ∧ u = u ∧ u = u
Brewka derives his extensions for the 3 valued models using some process. See
[10, slides 13–18]. We now reproduce in Figure 5 the original slide 18 of Brewka
[10] in order to compare ADF with our CN approach.
The Brewka extensions are given in the figure.
Figure 6 lists the models in CN obtained for the ADF theory.
We note that our model m1 is he same as Brewka’s v1 and our model m4 is
the same as Brewka’s v2. However, model m3 gives a = in, b = in, c = in and
13
ϕd = ¬b
a b
dc
ϕa = t
ϕc = a ∧ b
ϕb = b
• models:
– v1 = {a 7→ t, b 7→ t, c 7→ t, d 7→ f} corresponds to {a, b, c,¬d}
– v2 = {a 7→ t, b 7→ f, c 7→ f, d 7→ t} corresponds to {a,¬b,¬c, d}
• grounded model: v1 = {a 7→ t, b 7→ u, 7→ u, d 7→ u} corresponds to {a}
Figure 5:
model a = > Na b = b Nb c = a ∧ b Nc d = ¬b Nd
m1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
m2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
m3 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
m4 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
Figure 6:
d = und, and model m2 gives b = c = und and a = d = in. We do not get the
Brewka’s grounded model G = {a = in, b = c = d = und}.
This model is not one of the model of the theory
∆C = {x↔ ϕx|x a node in Figure 5} ∪Θn.
So how does Brewka get his grounded extension? Look at v1 and v2, a gets
1 in both, but b, c and d get value 1 in one of them and 0 in the other. So if
we look at G with the undecided value u given to b, c and d for each of these
arguments there are extensions which make its value 1 and there are extensions
which make its value 0. Therefore their value, according to ADF is undecided.
From our point of view, this way of looking at undecided is just external
combinatorics, devoid of conceptual content. According to our view only ¬x ∧
¬Nx makes x undecided, namely x is false but not strongly false.
G is not an extension. It is not a model of ∆C because of the axiom d = ¬b.
Obviously we could try and add restrictions on the models to get the same
results as Brewka (i.e. implement ADF in CN) but why should we do that at
all? Our methodology is sound and stronger.
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Given that we had N in the object language, we can do more than ADF.
ADF writes the acceptance conditions in 2-valued classical logic and brings in
the undecided value only through the semantic interpretation. We have the
undecided value (¬x∧¬Nx) in the language itself and therefore we can put the
undecided property into the acceptance conditions. Consider the joint attack
described in Figure 7.
Suppose all three attackers a, b, c are undecided. In this case we traditionally
say that x is also undecided because we do not know, maybe all three a = b = c =
in. This could happen. If, however, we adopt the new view that the chance that
all three attackers are “in” can be disregarded, then we want to say it in our
acceptance conditions.
So we want to say
(Fin(x)) x↔ (Na ∧Nb ∧Nc)
∨
(¬a ∧ ¬Na ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬Nb ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬Nc)
(Fout(x)) a ∨ b ∨ c→ Nx
(Fin(a, b, c))
a↔ Nb
b↔ Na ∧Nc
c↔ Nb
(Fout(a, b, c))
a ∨ c→ Nb
b→ Na ∧Nc
Can ADF express exactly the same extensions as what CN gets for the
above, especially the one a = b = c = und, x = in?
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CC6. Using CN for the probabilistic approach
There are many papers on probabilistic argumentation. Our paper [18] offers
a comprehensive approach based on probability models of classical logic. We
shall therefore compare the probabilistic use of CN with the approach in [18].
We shall use the network of Figure 8 as an example.
The approach of [18] regards {a, b} as atoms of classical propositional logic.
The logic with these atoms has the following models
m2 : a ∧ b;x
m2 : a ∧ ¬b; y
m3 : ¬a ∧ b; z
m4 : ¬a ∧ ¬b; 1− x− y − z
We can give a probability distribution P on the models
P (m1) = x
P (m2) = y
P (m3) = z
P (m4) = 1− x− y − z.
The fact that these nodes {a, b} are part of the network (S,R) of Figure 8 is
reflected in the probability having to satisfy the equational approach equation
called E3 in [18] (see [39] for the Equational Approach to argumentation).
(E3) P (x) = P (
∧
yRx
¬y).
In our case this means
• P (a) = P (¬b)
• P (b) = P (¬a)
where
• P (x) =∑mx P (m)
Therefore the equations we get are
• x+ y = 1− x− z
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• x+ z = 1− x− y
These two are the same equation, yielding
1− x− y − z = P (m4) = x.
Therefore any probability distribution P of the form
P (a ∧ b) = x
P (a ∧ ¬b) = y
P (¬a ∧ b) = z
P (¬a ∧ ¬b) = x
with 2x+ y + z = 1 is a good one, respecting the attack relation.
We have P (a) = x+ y, P (b) = x+ z, P (¬a ∧ ¬b) = x.
Let us now check how the models of CN relate to probability. For the
language with atoms {a,Na, b,Nb} satisfying the CN axiom
Nx→ ¬x
we can have the following models hi,j = αi ∧ βj , i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2, 3 where
α1 = a ∧ ¬Na
α2 = ¬a ∧ ¬Na
α3 = ¬a ∧Na
β1 = b ∧ ¬Nb
β2 = ¬b ∧ ¬Nb
β3 = ¬b ∧Nb.
Here we have 9 models as opposed to 6 models of the previous approach. Let
the probabilities on these models be
pi(αi ∧ βj) = Pi,j
with ∑
i,j
Pi,j = 1.
The models must satisfy the theory ∆A for the network of Figure 8. These are
Na→ ¬a
Nb→ ¬b
a↔ Nb
b↔ Na
¬a ∧ ¬Na→ ¬b ∧ ¬Nb
¬b ∧ ¬Nb→ ¬a ∧ ¬Na.
So only 3 models are models of ∆A. These are
h1 = a ∧ ¬Na ∧Nb ∧ ¬b
h2 = ¬a ∧Na ∧ b ∧ ¬Nb
h3 = ¬a ∧ ¬Na ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬Nb.
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Let the relative probabilities be p1, p2, p3 respectively with
∑
pi = 1.
Note that h1 is the extension a = in, b = out h2 is the extension b = in, a =
out and h3 is the extension a = b = und.
The first difference between the approaches is that while the approach in [18]
gives probability to arguments (called in [18] “the internal approach”), the CN
approach ends up giving probabilities to extensions (called in [18] “the external
approach”).
Giving probability to extensions is not new. It is supported by many authors
(see references/discussion in [18]). Let us calculate the probabilities pi(a) and
pi(b). We get
pi(a) = p1, pi(b) = p2, pi(¬a ∧ ¬b) = p3.
Comparing the two approaches, it makes sense to equate
p3 = x, p2 = x+ z, p1 = x+ y.
The main difference is that we are giving probabilities to 2-valued models in
[18] and using CN we are using 3-valued models.
In both cases we give probabilities to models. However, in case of CN, the
models are extensions and so we are giving probabilities to extensions also.
CC7. CN and bipolar networks
Note that in CN we get support and contrary arguments for free. Since we have
implication “→” in the logic, we can write “x → y” to mean “x supports y”
and since we have negation “¬” in the logic, we can view ¬x as the contrary of
x. We need not introduce additional atoms into the argumentation network for
contraries, nor do we have to introduce an additional arrow for support into the
network. Furthermore, since we have negation, we have the additional option
to represent “x supports y” as “x ¬y” namely as x→ N¬y.
Let us do this in a systematic manner.
Definition 4.1
1. A bipolar network B has the form B = (S,Ra, Rs), where Ra ⊆ S × S is
the attack relation (also denoted by ) and Rs ⊆ S × S is the support
relation (also denoted by ⇒).
2. Given a bipolar network B, we offer two possible translations into CN.
• τ1(x y) = x→ Ny
• τ1(x⇒ y) = x→ y
• τ2(x y) = x→ Ny
• τ2(x⇒ y) = x→ N¬y
3. Note that the complete extensions of the bipolar networks will be obtained
from all the models of CN.
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Remark 4.2
1. We note that x → y implies x → N¬y. This holds because, as we shall
see in Section 5, ¬Ny → N¬y and because y → N¬y both hold. Thus τ1
is stronger than τ2.
2. When we have a translation τ from one system (e.g. B) into another (e.g.
CN), we need to examine the properties of soundness and completeness.
Soundness in our case means that whatever we consider as a bipolar com-
plete extension for B will turn out to be a complete extension according to
CN. Completeness means that CN does not give any additional complete
extensions.
The problem in this case is that there is disagreement in the community
about how to define the complete extensions for B. The main papers of C.
Cayrol and M. C. Lagasquie-Schiex are [28, 29]. These have been criticised
by G. Brewka and S. Woltran [11] and a solution was proposed in our
paper [26]. Thus a detailed analysis of soundness and completeness for
our translations must be postponed to a continuation paper [24]. However,
we can point out in this paper some key properties involved in [26].
The possible properties are as follows:
(P1)
x⇒ y, z  y
z  x
(P2)
x⇒ y, y  u
x u
(P3)
w  x, x⇒ y
w  y
We need to check these properties for both
τ(x y) = x→ y
and
τ(x⇒ y) = x→ N¬y.
What we need is consistency. Can we add the translation of these rules to
CN and remain consistent?
The answer is positive. So we can hope to have something like the following
theorem:
Theorem 4.3 Let P be a set of properties for a bipolar network B (e.g. (P1)–
(P3) of Remark 4.2). Let τ be a translation of B into CN, and let τ(P) be the
translation of P into CN. Then the translation τ of B into CN + τ(P) is sound
and complete.
As we said, we shall address this theorem in Part 2 of this paper.
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CC8. Limitations of the CN approach
The CN approach transforms the geometrical representation of an argumenta-
tion network A = (S,R) into a theory ∆A of the logic CN. Theorem 3.2 ensures
that the correspondence between complete extensions of A and models of ∆A
is sound and complete. We are trading off here, however, geometry for model
theory.
The previous CC1–CC4 discussed the advantages of the CN approach. The
limitations come from the fact that in the CN approach we obscure/lose the
geometrical aspects of A. Therefore any moves in argumentation theory which
use the geometry (e.g. the strongly connected components, SCC of Baroni et al.
[14]) will become less transparent. We can mathematically do them in CN, but
we would have to extract the geometry of A = (S,R) back out of ∆A!
The following Figure 9 can be used to illustrate our point using the CF2
semantics [14, 15].
The CN semantics gives the complete extension of all undecided to the
network A of Figure 9 in agreement, of course, with the traditional Dung ap-
proach. The CF2 semantics takes maximal conflict free subsets of the top SCC
and therefore yields the extensions {a, d}, {b, d}, {c, e}. CF2 relies on identifying
the SCCs. It relies on the geometry of (S,R).
The CN theory for this network A is
∆A = Θn ∪ {a→ Nb, b→ Nc, c→ Na, c→ Nd, d→ Ne, e↔ Nd,
d↔ Nc, c↔ Nb, b↔ Na, a↔ Nc}
Looking at ∆A, we have to define/extract the cycles in order to define the
CF2 semantics for A.
Gabbay’s approach using annihilators [14] also requires the use of geometry
but to a lesser extent. We can identify syntactically a cycle, say
x1 → Nx2, x2 → Nx3, . . . , xn → Nx1
and break the cycle by applying an annihilator, say to annihilate the point xi,
i.e. add a new point z(xi) to ∆A with z → Nxi, and look instead at
∆
z(xi)
A = ∆A ∪ {z(xi), z(xi)→ Nxi}.
We still need some geometric intuition in doing this.
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5 Introducing the logic CNN
5.1 A meta-level object level short discussion
The perceptive reader may be aware of Section 5 of my 2009 paper with Cam-
inada [1]. In this paper we describe several options of looking at an abstract
argumentation network (S,R). Since 2009, there were many other papers, which
put forward different representations of Abstract Argumentation Networks in
terms of well known logics, see for example [32]–[37]. We shall compare and
discuss these papers in our Comparison with the Literature Section 9. Mean-
while in this section, we want to make a critical point about the difference
between Object Level Vs Meta-Level representation of Abstract Argumentation
Networks, and so we consider now one of the possible options of Section 5 of
[1]. This option is to describe (S,R) completely in classical predicate logic. We
consider S as the domain of the logic and we consider the attack relation R as
a binary relation on S. In addition to that, we need 3 unary predicates, Q1, Q0
an Q2, representing the 3 Caminada labels for the elements of S, namely x is
“in”, x is “out” and x is “undecided”, respectively.
We write axioms in predicate logic basically expressing the properties of the
labelling relative to R making it a legitimate labelling. These are the following:
Consider the following classical theory ∆(R,Q0, Q1, Q?).
1. ∀x(Q0(x) ∨Q1(x) ∨Q?(x))
2. ¬∃x(Qi(x) ∧Qj(x)) for i 6= j, i, j ∈ {0, 1, ?}
3. ∀y(∀x(xRy → Q0(x))→ Q1(y)
4. ∀y(∃x(xRy ∧Q1(x))→ Q0(y))
5. ∀y(∀x(xRy → (Q0(x) ∨Q?(x))) ∧ ∃x(xRy ∧Q?(x))→ Q?(y))
Any model of ∆ with domain D defines an argumentation framework with
the set of argument S = D, and the attack relation is R and the labelling λ∆
is what we obtain from the elements satisfying the respective predicates Q0, Q1
and Q?. Notice that we are not using “=”.
If we want to characterise any specific argumentation framework A = (S,R)
we need equality and we need constant names for every element of S. We write
the following additional axioms A
6. ∀x(∨a∈S x = a)
7.
∧
a,b∈S,a 6=b a 6= b
8.
∧
a,b∈R aRb
The use of predicate logic to talk about (S,R) is meta-level. The predicates
Q1, Q0 and Q? are not logical connectives. We cannot write, for example, the
expression Q0(Q0(x)). In contrast, the logic CN is object level. It can express
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Figure 10:
the predicates Q1, Q0 and Q? in the object level, as well as the relation R, as
follows (see, however, Remark 3.6 of Section 3):
Q1(x) = def x
Q0(x) = def Nx
Q?(x) = def ¬x ∧ ¬Nx
xRy = def x→ Ny.
Note the difference between object level and meta-level. Suppose we want to
instantiate (S,R) with arguments which are formulas of predicate logic, say we
have xRy and we instantiate x = α and y = β. In the meta-level language
we cannot write αRβ. Even if we allow for the use of names “α” and “β” and
add appropriate axioms for the correct handling of names, we still do not know
what “α” R “β” means in terms of semantics. The meta-level translation does
not give any meaning to R it is just a translation. On the other hand , we can
write in our object level system the formula α → Nβ, and if we use predicate
logic with N , we can let the models of this predicate logic with N provide a
proposed semantics for the instantiation by using Theorem 3.2 as a definition.
Furthermore we can write additional axioms for N . For example we can also
write NNx and add an axiom (which is valid)
NN : x↔ NNx
On the other hand the meta-level predicate approach can deal with infinite
non-finitary networks , while our object level approach requires the network to
be finitary. We shall discuss the predicate approach further in the context of
comparing with paper [35] in Section 9.
5.2 The logics CN and CNN
Having explained the object level nature of our translation of argumentation
into CN, let us now focus on this logic.
So what kind of a logic is CN? Can we say more about it, in addition to
what we said in Section 1? The answer is yes. We can add a modal point of
view to that of Section 1.
Consider a modal logic with two possible worlds t and s. Assume that s is
accessible to t and t is accessible to s. So we have a symmetric non-reflexive
relation. See Figure 10.
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We further require on assignments to atoms that if the atom q is assigned
> at t, then it is assigned > at s (but not necessarily vice versae).
Let t be the actual world and let us have the modal connective N with the
following truth table
• t  NA iff s  ¬A
• s  NA iff t  ¬A
•  A iff t  A (i.e. t is the actual world)
Let us call this modal logic CNN.
We therefore have the following true in the actual world t
• CNN  Nq → ¬q, q atomic
• CNN  NNA↔ A
• CNN  N(A ∧B)↔ NA ∨NB
• CNN  N(A ∨B)↔ NA ∧NB
• CNN  N(N¬q → q)
• CNN  (A→ B)→ N(NB → NA)
In this context for atomic arguments q we understand the following in t:
(*1) q attacks p, reads q → Np
(*2) q is out, reads Nq
(*3) q is in, reads q
(*4) q is undecided, reads ¬q ∧ ¬Nq.
Definition 5.1 Let CNN be the logic extending CN with the following axioms
NN : NNx↔ x
N∧ : N(x ∧ y)↔ Nx ∨Ny
N∨ : N(x ∨ y)↔ Nx ∧Ny
N↔: x↔ y implies Nx↔ Ny, where IN does not occur in x or y2
N¬ : N¬x↔ ¬Nx
Example 5.2 Consider the network of Figure 11
The Figure describes a network containing the points x, y, z where x is the
only attacker of y and y is the only attacker of z. Given that, we know that
no matter what complete extension we are dealing with, the value of x must be
equal to the value of z.
2Note that we have > ↔ (Nx→ ¬x) but not N> ↔ N(Nx→ ¬x).
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• x = in ⇒ y = out ⇒ z = in
• x = out ⇒ y = in ⇒ z = out
• x = und ⇒ y = und ⇒ z = und
If we look at Fin,Fout and Fund applied to these points, we see that the
formulas
1. x→ Ny
2. y → Nz
3. y ↔ Nx
4. z ↔ Ny
5. ¬x ∧ ¬Nx→ ¬y ∧ ¬Ny
6. ¬y ∧ ¬Ny → ¬z ∧ ¬Nz
must hold in the logic. We also have, of course, the axiom schema Nu→ ¬u.
These formulas must prove x↔ z and Nx↔ Nz. We now proceed to prove
them:
a Assume x, then from 1. and 4. we get z.
b Assume z, then from 4. we get Ny and from the axiom we get ¬y and so
from 3. we get ¬Nx. If we had ¬x then from 5. and 6. we would have
got ¬z. Therefore we must have x.
c Assume Nx, then from 2. and 3. we get Nz.
d Assume Nz, then from axiom we get ¬z, and therefore from 4. and 1. we
get ¬x. If we had ¬Nx, we would have got from 5. and 6. ¬Nz, and so
we must have Nx.
We thus proved x↔ z from a. and b. and we proved Nx↔ Nz from c. and d..
Example 5.3 Consider the network A = (S,R) of Figure 12
The axioms of ∆A are the following:
1. x↔ Nx ∧Ny
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2. y ↔ Nx
3. x→ Nx
4. x→ Ny
5. (a) (¬x ∧ ¬y) ∧ (¬Nx ∨ ¬Ny)→ ¬x ∧ ¬Nx
(b) ¬x ∧ ¬Nx→ ¬y ∧ ¬Ny
The network A has two possible extensions y = in, x = out, and x = y = und.
So we want to be able to prove (using ∆A and the extra axiom NNA↔ A) that
either y = in and x = out or y = x = und. This means we want to prove (6)
6. (y ∧Nx)∨(¬y ∧ ¬Ny ∧ ¬x ∧ ¬Nx)
Let us show we can do it!
From (1) we get x→ Nx and since we have the axiom Nx→ ¬x we get
7. ¬x
We now prove
8. Ny → ¬Ny
Assume Ny, therefore by axiom we get ¬y and so from (2) we get ¬Nx, and so
from from (7) and (5b) we get ¬Ny. Thus we have proved (9) below:
9. ¬Ny.
Therefore, in view of (9) and (7), (6) becomes (6*)
6*. (y ∧Nx)∨(¬y ∧ ¬Nx)
or, equivalently (6**)
6**. (y ∨Nx)→ y ∧Nx.
In view of (2), (6**) becomes
6***. (y ∨ y)→ (y ∧ y).
which holds.
25
y1 , . . . , ym
z
Figure 13:
z
z1 , . . . , zn
Figure 14:
6 Conjunctive and disjunctive attacks in CN
In 2009 Gabbay [3] introduced the option of conjunctive (joint) attacks and the
notion of disjunctive attacks. The basic configuration can be seen in Figures 13,
14, 15 and 16. In Figure 15 the nodes {y1, . . . , ym} jointly mount a disjunctive
attack on the nodes {z1, . . . , zn}. The meaning in Figure 15 is that if all of yi
are in then at least one of zj is out. See Figure 16. Translated into CN this
means:
m∧
i=1
yi →
n∨
j=1
Nzj
Definition 6.1 (CD network)
1. Let S be a non-empty set of arguments. Consider the set Ω of all non-
empty subsets of S. Use the notation G,H ⊆ S for such subsets. Let R
be a binary relation on such subsets, i.e.
R ⊆ (2S −∅)2.
A conjunctive-disjunctive argumentation network (CD-network) has the
form (S,Ω,R).
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m∧
i=1
yi 
n∧
j=1
zj
Figure 16:
2. When all attacked sets are singletons we get only joint attacks of the form
GR{x}, x ∈ S
We can use the notation
R0 = {(G, x)|GR{x}}.
3. When all attacking sets are singletons we get only disjunctive attacks of
the form {x}RH.
Remark 6.2 We need to discuss the nature of the joint-disjunctive attack. The
disjunctive part of the definition is different in nature from the conjunctive part.
This may cause difficulties. Consider the disjunctive attack of Figure 17. x is
not attacked and so x = in. Thus we must have either a = out or b = out. So
the extensions are
x = in, b = out. a = und
x = in, a = out, b = und.
In CN we can write this as
x→ Na ∨Nb.
The reader should be strongly aware that the translation is from A = (S,R) into
CN and not the other direction.
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So if we have a joint attack of {x, a}  b, then the translation would be
x ∧ a→ Nb.
To make this point clearer note that the condition x→ Na∨Nb is equivalent
to the following two conditions
i. x = in and a 6= out → b = out
x ∧ ¬Na→ Nb
ii. x = in and b 6= out → a = out
x ∧ ¬Nb→ Na.
Consider now (i) as a new kind of joint attack as in Figure 18.
In this new kind of joint attack if one or more of the attackers is undecided,
then the attack still goes through. This also means that we get a new type of
single attack which we denote by
x—♦−→ y
where y is out even when x = undecided.
In fact, we can define x—♦−→ y as the truth > disjunctively attacking x∧y.
This view also implies that x—♦−→ y iff y—♦−→ x.
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This is not a good understanding of disjunctive attacks. Our intuitive under-
standing of being undecided is that x is undecided because x can go either way.
Either to x = in or to x = out. So we might want to say that in Figure 14, if
all zi are either in or undecided, with one zi undecided, then
∧
i zi is undecided
and hence z is undecided.
It is not our purpose to study in detail disjunctive attacks. We just want to
show that the logics CN and CNN are very good in expressing attacks. The
reader can see for a fact that in the CN language we can say whatever we want.
The attack x—♦−→ y can be written as ¬Nx→ Ny or equivalently ¬Ny → Nx.
There is no agreement in the literature on the meaning of the argument z
attacking the set of arguments H = {z1, . . . , zn}. In [3, 16] the definition is
z → ∨j Nzj, while in [4] the definition is ∨j(z → Nzj). See Section 8 below
for further discussion and also see [23].
These two options are the same in two valued logic but not if we have the
third undecided value.
Given the uncertainty of how to define complete extensions for networks with
disjunctive attacks, we can simply write the CN-formulas Fin,Fout,Fund that
we want and stipulate that the complete extensions are to be all CN models of
these formulas. For further discussion see Section 8 below.
Having concluded our discussion in the previous Remark 6.2, we still do need
to prove a correspondence theorem for the case of joint attacks only, since there
is agreement about them in the literature.
Definition 6.3
1. An argumentation network with joint attacks has the form (S,R0), where
S is a non-empty set of arguments and R0 ⊆ (2S − ∅) × S is the joint
attack relation.
2. A legitimate Caminada–Gabbay labelling from S into {in, out, und} is a
function λ satisfying the following conditions:
(CG1) λ(x) = in iff either x is not attacked by any G ⊆ S or for every
G ⊆ S such that GR0x, there exists a y ∈ G such that λ(y) = out.
(CG2) λ(x) = out iff for some G ⊆ S, GR0x and for all y ∈ G,λ(y) = in.
(CG3) λ(x) = und iff for all G ⊆ S, such that GR0x there exists a y ∈ G
such that λ(y) 6= in, and for some G′ ⊆ S, GR0x we have that for
all y ∈ G′, λ(y) = either in or und.
3. We identify the complete extensions of (S,R0) with the legitimate Caminada–
Gabbay labellings of S.
Theorem 6.4 Let A = (S,R0) be an argumentation network with joint attacks.
Let ∆A be its associated CN theory with FJointin ,F
Joint
out and F
Joint
und as defined in
CC2 of Section 4 and listed below.
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Then the models of ∆A correspond exactly to the Caminada–Gabbay la-
bellings of A according to Definition 6.3.
FJointout :
(
∨
GR0x
∧
z∈G z)→ Nx
for all x ∈ S
FJointin :
x↔ (∧GR0x∨z∈GNz)
for all x ∈ S
FJointund :
∧
GR0x
(
∨
z∈G
¬z) ∧ (
∨
GR0x
∧
z∈G
(z ∨ ¬Nz))→ ¬x ∧ ¬Nx
Proof.
Part A. Assume we have a legitimate λ. We define a model h = hλ of ∆A.
Let
• hλ(x) = 1 if λ(x) = in
• hλ(Nx) = 1 if λ(x) = out
We show that all axioms of CN hold.
1. Show Nx→ ¬x. Otherwise hλ(Nx) = hλ(x) = 1, but this means λ(x) =
in = out which is impossible.
2. We check FJoinout . Assume hλ(
∨
GR0x
∧
z∈G z) = 1. So for some GR0x we
have hλ(z) = 1 for all z ∈ G. This means for this G that λ(z) = in for all
z ∈ G. Hence λ(x) = out. Hence hλ(Nx) = 1.
3. We check FJointin .
(a) Assume hλ(x) = 1. This means λ(x) = in. Hence for any GR0x we
have that for some z ∈ G,λ(z) = out. Thus for all GR0x there is a
z ∈ G s.t. h(Nz) = 1, i.e. h(∧GR0x∨z∈GNz) = 1.
(b) Suppose hλ(
∧
GR0x
∨
z∈GNz) = 1. This means for every GR0x there
is a z such that hλ(Nz) = 1. But this means for every GR0x there
is a z ∈ G s.t. λ(z) = out. Thus λ(x) = in so hλ(x) = 1.
4. We check FJointund : Assume that
(a) hλ(
∧
GR0x
∨
z∈G ¬z) = 1
(b) h(
∨
GR0x
∧
z∈G(z ∨ ¬Nz)) = 1.
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We show that h(¬x ∧ ¬Nx) = 1.
From (a) we get that every GR0x has a z such that hλ(z) = 0, i.e. λ(z) 6=
in.
From (b) we get that there is a GR0x such that for all z ∈ G, we have
that ¬z → ¬Nz holds.
Thus for one GR0x there is a z such that h(¬z ∧ ¬Nz) = 1. This means
λ(z) 6= in and λ(z) 6= out, i.e. λ(z) = undecided.
So we got that for every GR0x, not all λ(z) = in, for z ∈ G and for one
such G′ all z are either in or undecided with one λ(z) = und.
This implies λ(x) = und. So hλ(¬x) = hλ(¬Nx) = 1.
Part B. Assume h is a model of ∆A. Define λh
• λh(x) = in if h(x) = 1
• λh(x) = out if h(Nx) = 1
• hλ(x) = und if h(¬x ∧ ¬Nx) = 1.
We show λh is a legitimate labelling.
1. λh is well defined because h satisfies
h  Nx→ ¬x.
2. We show (CG1)
(a) If x is not attacked then x ∈ ∆A and so λh(x) = in.
(b) Assume that for every GR0x there is y ∈ G with λh(y) = out.
This means for everyGR0x there is y ∈ G with h(Ny) = 1. So h(
∧
GR0x
∨
y∈GNy) =
1.
So by FJointin we get that h(x) = 1 i.e. λ(x) = in.
3. We show (CG2). Assume for some GR0x and all y ∈ G that λh(y) = in.
This means
h(
∨
GR0x
∧
y∈G
y) = 1.
Hence by FJointout , h(Nx) = 1, i.e. λ(x) = out.
4. We show (CG3). Suppose for every GR0x there is a y s.t. λ(y) 6= in and in
some G′R0x for y ∈ G′, λ(y) = in or undecided and that there is a y0 ∈ G′
such that λ(y0) = und.
Then h(
∧
GR0x
∨
y∈G ¬y) = 1 and h(
∨
GR0x
∧
y∈G(y ∨ ¬Ny)) = 1.
This means that the antecedent of FJointund holds and so h(¬x ∧ ¬Nx) = 1
and so λ(x) = und.
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Theorem 6.5 Let A = (S,R0) be a argumentation network with joint attacks.
Then there exists a Caminada–Gabbay legitimate labelling λ for it, (i.e. it does
have complete extensions).
Proof. We reproduce a construction from Gabbay’s 2009 paper [3] which faith-
fully reduces joint attacks to single attacks. This means that (S,R0) can be
faithfully embedded into a traditional network (S′, R′) with S ⊆ S′. Since
(S′, R′) has complete extensions, we will get that (S,R0) has complete exten-
sions.
We now proceed to generate the new points to add to S to obtain S′, and
we define R′.
Let x ∈ S. Let G1, . . . , Gn be all the attacking sets of x. Let Gi =
{zi,1, . . . , zi,r(i)}, i = 1, . . . , n. Introduce new points as follows:
Sx = {x(Gi), e(x,Gi, zi,1), . . . , e(x,Gi, zi,r(i)|i = 1, . . . , n}.
Let S′ = S ∪⋃x∈S Sx.
Note that for any configuration (G1, . . . , Gn, x), where Gi are all the sets
attacking x, the sets Sx are all sets of distinct disjoint points. Note also the
correspondence between each zi,j ∈ Gi and the point e(x,Gi, zi,j). So, for
example, if {a, b}R0x and {a, b}R0y hold and {a, b} is the only attacker of x
and the only attacker of y, the new points will be
Sx = {x({a, b}), e(x, {a, b, }, a), e(x, {a, b}, b)}
Sy = {y({a, b}), e(y, {a, b}, a), e(y, {a, b}, b)}.
Define R′ on S′ as follows.
For any G1, . . . , Gn attacking any x, let
zi,jR
′e(x,Gi.zi,j)
e(x,Gi, zi,j)R
′x(Gi)
x(Gi)R
′x.
Figures 19 and 20 show what we have down for the case of x ∈ S and Gi are
the only joint attacker of x with Gi = {zi,1, . . . , zi,r(i)}, i = 1, . . . , n.
We want to prove the following claims.
Claim 1. Let λ be a legitimate labelling of (S′, R′). Then µ = λ  S is a
legitimate labelling of (S,R0).
Claim 2. Let µ be a legitimate labelling of (S,R0). Then µ can be uniquely
extended to a labelling λ of (S′, R′) and this λ is legitimate for (S′, R′).
To prove the above we need some shorthand definitions.
Let G be a set of nodes. We say that G is in if every x ∈ G is in. We say
that G is out if some x ∈ G is out and we say G is undecided if every x in G is
not in and some y ∈ G is undecided.
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zn,1, . . . , zn,r(n)
x
z1,r, . . . , z1,r(1) , . . . ,
Figure 19: Joint attacks of G1, . . . , Gn
e(x,Gn, zn,1), . . . , e(x,Gn, zn,r(n))
x
x(G1) x(Gn),. . . ,
zi,1, , . . . , z1,r(1) ,. . . , zn,1, . . . , zn,r(n)
e(x,G1, zi,1), . . . , e(x,G1, zi,r(1)) ,. . . ,
Figure 20: Reduction of the joint attacks
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Proof of Claim 1 and Claim 2. This is proved in [3]. We can see the idea
of the proof by comparing Figures 19 and 20.
1. Suppose x is in, in Figure 20 then we must have that all of x(Gi) are out.
For x(Gi) to be out, one of {e(x,Gi, zi,j)|j = 1, 2, . . .} must be in. So one
of {zi,j |j = 1, . . .} must be out and so the set Gi must be out.
This means that x = in implies that all Gi are out. In fact we have that
x is in if and only if all Gi are out. But this is exactly the condition for
x = in, in (S,R0).
2. Suppose x is out in (S′, R′). Then some x(Gi) is in. Therefore all of
{e(x,Gi, zi,j |j = 1, . . .} for this Gi are out. Hence all of {zi,j} for this Gi
are in, and hence Gi is in. Again this goes in both (iff) direction and is
the out condition in (S,R0).
3. Suppose x is undecided in (S′, R′). Then all of x(Gi) are either out or
undecided, with one x(Gi) at least being undecided. If x(Gi) is out then
as we have seen before, Gi must be in. If x(Gi) is undecided then all
elements of Gi must be either in or if not, in then undecided, with at least
one element of Gi being undecided. Again this argument is an if and only
if argument and is exactly the condition for x = und in (S,R0).
4. The considerations in (1), (2), (3) also show that Claim 2 is true because
the values of Gi and x determine the values of e(x,Gi, zi,j) and x(Gi)
uniquely.
The theorem follows from the claims, since (S′, R′) does have legitimate la-
bellings.
Remark 6.6 The considerations in the proof of Theorem 6.5 show that basically
the configuration in Figure 20 “implies uniquely” the configuration of Figure 19.
This means that if we write in the logic CNN the conditions F′in,F
′
out,F
′
und for
x and for all the additional new points in (S′, R′), it should logically imply in
CNN, the conditions F Jointin ,F
Joint
out and F
Joint
und for x in (S,R0). This means the
new points play no real logical role.
Let us prove this, also as an exercise in the deduction capabilities of CNN.
Let us write all the F′ of x for (S′, R′) and prove all the FJoint of x for
(S,R0).
We are given the following data.
1. x↔ ∧iNx(Gi)
2.
∨
i x(Gi)→ Nx
3. x(Gi)↔
∧
j Ne(x,Gi, zi,j)
4.
∨
j e(x,Gi, zi,j)→ Nx(Gi)
5. (a) zi,j → Ne(x.Gi, zi,j)
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(b) ¬zi,j ∧ ¬Nzi,j → ¬e(x,Gi, zi,j) ∧ ¬Ne(x,Gi, zi,j)
6. e(x,Gi, zi,j)↔ Nzi,j
7. (a)
∧
i ¬x(Gi) ∧
∨
i ¬Nx(Gi)→ ¬x ∧ ¬Nx
(b)
∧
i ¬e(x,Gi, zi,j) ∧
∨
j ¬Ne(x,Gi, zij)→ ¬x(Gi) ∧ ¬Nx(Gi)
Let us see what we can prove in CNN from (1)–(7). We start by proving FJointin :
x↔
∧
GR0x
∨
z∈G
Nz
8. (a) Assume x
(b) from (1) we get for all i, Nx(Gi).
(c) From (8b) we get ¬x(Gi).
(d) Fix an arbitrary i. We show that for at least one i we have e(x,Gi, zi,j).
(e) we assume in order to reach a contradiction that for all j we have
¬e(x,Gi, zi,j). If by any chance we have that for at least one j
¬Ne(x,Gi, zi,j), we would get by (7b) ¬Nx(Gi) also, contradicting
(8b). Thus we must have Ne(x,Gi, zi,j) for all j. But then by (3)
we get x(Gi), contradicting (8c). Therefore (10d) must hold.
(f) So from (6) and (10d) we get that for at least one j we have Nzi,j.
(g) summarising, having assumed x in (8a) we get from (8d) and (8e)
that for all i, there exists a j such that Nzi,j holds. This is the
direction x→ ∧GR0x∨z∈GNz.
9. (a) Assume for each i there exists a j such that Nzi,j holds.
(b) Therefore from (6) we get that for all i there exists a j such that
e(x,Gi, zi,j) holds.
(c) Therefore from (4) we have for all i, Nx(Gi) holds.
(d) Therefore from (1) we have that x holds.
(e) Summarising, we have proved that
∧
GR0x
∨
z∈GNz → x.
We continue to derive FJointout .
10. From (5) we get
∧
j zi,j →
∧
j e(x,Gi, zi,j).
11. Using (6) and (3) we get
∧
j zi,j → x(Gi).
12. From (2) and (11) we get
∨
i
∧
j zi,j → Nx. This is FJointout .
We now show FJointund .
We need first to prove (14) below.
From (3) we get
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13.
∧
i ¬x(Gi)↔
∧
i
∨
j ¬Ne(x,Gi, zi,j).
From (6) substituted in the right hand side of (13) we get
14.
∧
i ¬x(Gi)↔
∧
i
∨
j ¬NNzi,j
hence
∧
i ¬x(Gi)↔
∧
i
∨
j ¬zi,j.
We now carry on to prove FJointund .
15. Assume the antecedents of FJointund , namely
(a)
∨
i
∧
j(zi,j ∨ ¬Nzij).
(b)
∧
i
∨
j ¬zi,j.
We want to show the consequent
(c) ¬x ∧ ¬Nx.
From (a) there is an i∗ satisfying
16.
∧
j(zi∗,j ∨ ¬zi∗,j).
For this i∗ we use (b) an get
∨
j ¬zi∗,j. Let j∗ be a choice for this disjunc-
tion. We thus get that
17. ¬zi∗,j∗ ∧ ¬Nzi∗,j∗ holds.
Therefore by axiom (5b) we get that
18. ¬e(x.Gi∗ , zi∗,j∗) ∧ ¬Ne(x,Gi∗ , zi∗,j∗) holds.
Look again at Gi∗ = {zi∗,1, . . . , zi∗,r(i∗)). We have for each (i∗, j) that
either zi∗,j holds in which case by (5a) Ne(x,Gi∗ , zi∗,j) holds or ¬zi∗,j
holds in which case by (15) we get that ¬zi∗,j∧¬Nzi∗,j holds and therefore
by (5b)
19. ¬e(x,Gi∗ , zi∗,j) ∧ ¬Ne(x.Gi∗ , zi,j) holds.
Therefore (7b) holds for Gi∗ and hence
20. ¬x(Gi∗) ∧ ¬Ne(Gi∗) holds.
Let us see what we got so far. From (14) we have∧
i
¬x(Gi)
From (19) we get ∨
i
¬Nx(Gi)
holds.
Therefore the antecedent of (7a) holds and we get
(c) ¬x ∧ ¬Nx

36
7 Higher level attacks
Higher level attacks are attacks on attacks. This concept was first introduced
in 2005 in [8] (see also[22] for an expanded version). The idea is very simple.
Suppose we are given an abstract system (S,R) where S is a non-empty set of
objects and R is a binary relation on S, ( i.e. R is a set of pairs (x, y) where
x and y are from S). In argumentation theory S is a set of arguments and
R is the attack relation, (denoted by x  y, for (x, y) in R), but in general
there are other interpretations for S and R. In the abstract, we can regard the
elements of R also as objects and therefore we can expand the relation R into
a wider relation R1 also containing elements from R itself. This means that in
argumentation we allow also to have attacks on attacks. So we can also write
possibly
i z  (x y)
ii (u v)  (x y)
iii (u v)  z
The papers [2, 5, 6, 7, 9] deal only with possibility (i) above, but there is no
mathematical reason not to generalise to all three possibilities and even iterate
the process.
The problem is to extend whatever semantics we have for the case of (S,R)
to the general iterated case where we turned the elements of R into objects .
In the case of higher level attacks in argumentation, we need to give se-
mantics for the generalised higher level networks. This is not difficult, thanks
to the nature of the Caminada labelling. Since we regard higher level attacks
as legitimate objects to be attacked (following the pattern in (i)), we can give
such objects labels from the set {in, out,undecided} and require the Caminada
conditions (conditions C1,C2, C3 of the beginning of Section 3) to hold for the
higher level attacks.
Our task in this paper is to express higher level attacks in the system CN.
To show how to express higher level attacks in CN we shall reduce higher
level attacks to joint attacks by adding points to the network. First, let us define
the networks we are dealing with.
Definition 7.1
1. Let S be a non-empty set of arguments. A higher level network based on
S has the form A = (S, ρ1, . . . , ρn) where
ρ1 ⊆ S × S, first level attacks
...
ρi+1 ⊆ S × ρi, i+ 1 level attacks
...
ρn ⊆ S × ρn−1, nth level attacks
Note that S, ρ1, . . . , ρn are all pairwise disjoint
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Figure 21:
2. Let A = (S, ρ1, . . . , ρn) be a higher level network. We define the associated
joint attacks network Aτ = (Sτ , Rτ ) as follows:
(a) Sτ = S ∪
⋃
i ρi
(b) Let x ∈ Sτ . Then there is a unique i such that x ∈ ρi. Let (z1, x), . . . , (zk, x)
be all the attackers of x in ρi+1. Then let the following joint attacks
be in Rτ
{z1, (z1, x)}Rτx
...
{zk, (zk, x)}Rτx.
3. We stipulate/define that the complete extensions of A to be the restrictions
of the complete extensions λ of Aτ to S
Example 7.2 Consider Figure 21
In Figure 21 we gave names to the attacks.
α = z  x
β = y  α
γ = u β
δ = w  γ
It is natural to give the double arrows names, because in higher level attacks we
treat them as objects to be attacked.
Figure 21 becomes Figure 22.
This illustrates how we reduce higher level attacks to joint attacks, simply by
giving names to the attacking arcs.
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8 Disjunctive attacks
Our starting point is the representation of the disjunctive attack of Figure 14.
We noted in Remark 6.2 that this attack is represented in CN by the formula
z →
n∨
i=1
Nzi.
In classical logic this formula is equivalent to the formula
n∨
i=1
(z → Nzi).
On the face of it, it looks like a disjunctive attack on a set is reduced to attacking
one of the elements of the set. The next example will explain what is really going
on.
Example 8.1 Consider the networks in Figures 23, 24 and 25.
The representation of the attacks of Figure 23 in CN is through (1)–(3):
1. a→ Nb
2. b→ Na
3. a→ Nx ∨Ny.
Item (3) is equivalent in classical logic to item (4):
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Figure 25:
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4. (a→ Nx) ∨ (a→ Ny).
The representation of the attacks of Figure 24 is by items (1) and (2) as well
as item (4.1)
4.1. a→ Nx
while the representation of the attacks in Figure 25 is by items (1), (2) and
(4.2).
4.2. a→ Ny.
We recall that we said that in CN the attack relations of the given source
network are brought forward (using N) from the meta-level in the object level.
So the meaning of the equivalence in classical logic of
(Equiv) : (a→ Nx ∨Ny)↔ ((a→ Nx) ∨ (a→ Ny))
is the meta-level statement (MD):
(MD): E is a complete extension of the network of Figure 23 iff E is a complete
extension of at least one of the networks of Figures 24 or 25.
We make two critical comments.
(CC1) (MD) is a meta-level property. We can ask the following question (Q)
for example:
(Q) Given traditional networks (S,Rj), i = 1, . . . , k, then under what
conditions do there exist a disjunctive network (S,R) such that (MD)
holds?
(CC2) If our logic CN were not classical logic, but say intuitionistic
logic (as will be investigated in Part 2 of this paper [24]), then the
equivalence (Equiv) will not hold and the results would be different.
We are now ready for a formal definition of disjunctive attacks. We use
Caminada–Gabbay labelling.
Definition 8.2
1. A disjunctive argumentation network has the form (S, ρ), where S is a
non-empty set and ρ ⊆ S × (2S −∅). See Figure 26.
2. Let x ∈ S. Let y1, . . . , yk be all the elements of S which attack x directly.
Let z1, . . . , zm all be elements of S which disjunctively attack sets which
contain x, namely ziρ{x, ui1, . . . , uir(i)}. We say zi indirectly attacks x.
3. Let λ : S 7→ {in, out, und}. We say that λ is a legitimate Caminada–
Gabbay labelling for (S, ρ) iff the following conditions hold:
(D1) λ(x) = in if λ(yi) = out, i = 1, . . . , k and for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m, if λ(zj) = in
then for some k, λ(ujk) = out.
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(D2) λ(x) = out, if for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k, λ(yi) = in, or for some j, (λ(zj) = in
and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ r(j) we have λ(ujk) 6= out.
(D3) λ(x) = und iff all attacks on x direct or indirect are either out or un-
decided, and where at least one attack is undecided, where the following
define the meaning of the terms we just used.
• A direct attack on x by y is out if λ(y) = out. It is undecided if
λ(y) = und.
• An indirect attack of z on x using the disjunctive attacked set {x, u1, . . . , ur}
is out if either λ(z) is out or for some j, λ(uj) is out. The attack is
undecided if λ(z) and λ(uj) are all different from out, with at least
one of them is und.
Remark 8.3 Using higher level attacks and >, we can implement disjunctive
attacks using conjunctive attacks. See Figure 27. This figure implements the
disjunctive attack aρ{b, c} . We have that {b, c}  >) and >  ({b, c}  >)
and a (> → ({b, c} >))
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9 Comparison with literature
9.1 Comparison with the paper of S.Villata, G. Boella
and L .van der Torre: Attack Semantics for Abstract
Argumentation
We compare with paper [25]. The paper is different from ours, but since it has
a similar name, we should address it.
Our paper translates argumentation into classical logic with a symbol “Na”,
meaning “a is under attack”. Paper [25] regards the attack arrows as objects
and discusses semantics for them. (In our paper “a  b” is a wff “a → Nb”).
Our set up is completely different. Furthermore, the idea of regarding the attack
arrow as an object and labelling it already appears in [2, Figure 13] and in [8].
However, we do want to make a point in this paper using the machinery of [25]
and so let us quote some passages from them and then make our point.
Begin quote 1:
Example 2 Consider AF = 〈A,→〉 with A = {a; b; c; d; e} and
{a → b, b → a, b → c, c → d, d → e, e → c} visualized in Figure
2. The complete extensions are Ecompl(AF ;A) = {∅, {a}, {b; d}}. ∅
is the unique grounded extension, {a} and {b; d} are the preferred
extensions, and {b; d} is the stable extension. In the complete exten-
sion ∅ the arguments are rejected, because they are not defended. In
the extension {b; d} the other arguments are rejected, because they
are attacked by an accepted counterargument.
e
a b c
d
Figure 2: The argumentation framework of Example 2.
Begin quote 2:
Example 3 (Continued from Example 2 in quote 1 above):
The grounded extension ∅ has only successful attacks, the preferred
extension {a} has {a ↪→ b, c ↪→ d, d ↪→ e, e ↪→ c} as successful
attacks, and the stable extension {b, d} has {b ↪→ a, b ↪→ c, d ↪→ e}.
Begin quote 3:
We define attack labeling analogous to argument labeling. An attack
is in when its attacking argument is in, an attack is undecided when
its attacking argument is undecided, and an argument is out when
its attacking argument is out. An attack is successful when it is in
or undecided, whereas an argument is accepted when it is in. For
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Figure 28:
example, if an argument is rejected, but at least one of its attacks is
successful, then the argument is undecided.
Example 5 (Continued from Example 3 in quote 2 above).
The grounded extension ∅ has only undecided attacks, the preferred
extension {a} has in attack a ↪→ b and undecided attacks c ↪→ d, d ↪→
e, e ↪→ c, and the stable extension {b, d}has in attacks b ↪→ a, b ↪→
c, d ↪→ e and no undecided attacks.
End quotes.
Let us implement the attack network of Example 2 in quote 1 above and of
its Figure 2 in our CN logic using the idea of [2, Figure 13]. Note that this idea
is NOT what [25] does but we start with our own approach for comparison. We
add for each arrow x y a new node zx,y and translate the attack x y into
the conjunctive attack (x, zx,y)  y. We thus get Figure 28. This figure has
conjunctive attacks and can be dealt with within CN.
Note that all the attack arrows, za,b, zb,a, zb,c, zc,d, zd,e and ze,c are all in,
because they are not attacked. This is as it should be according to the Dung
traditional approach.
However, as we said, the above is not the attack semantics of [25]. According
to [25] an attack x  y is out if x is out. So the attacks in Figure 28 are not
always in, but depend on the extensions chosen, as discussed in [25] and quoted
above in Example 5 of quote 3. So we need a new figure to implement the attack
semantics of [25].
To achieve that we need to add that ¬x attacks zx,y. This is easy to write
in CN: ¬x → Nzx,y. No new figure is really needed. However we can, if we
insist, use Figure 29. It is a quite complicated higher level figure.
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If we do not want to use higher level attacks, we can use Figure 30. The
figures tend to be complicated because we need to add the nodes ¬x on x y
(or on zx,y). In CN we just write ¬x→ Nzx,y, which is much simpler and does
not add any nodes!
Independent of the problem of representing the attack semantics of [25] and
the idea that if x is out then x y is also out, is compatible with another idea
of ours, from [3, Section 4.3]. In [3], we regard x  y as a channel, carrying
an attack signal, sent by x towards y. So if x is out, no signal is sent but the
channel is alive. We can say that according to [25], if x is out, the channel itself
is out.
Let us now say more about our approach of [3, Section 4.3]. We want to look
at the attack a b as a signal from a to b. As such it can be considered as an
object (a wave front). It therefore can split or it can interfere/join with another
signal. This idea was presented in [3, Section 4.3] and will be fully developed in
[23]. Figure 31 illustrates this idea. Compare with Figure 23.
In Figure 31 the attack emanates from a and disjunctively splits into two
attacks one that attacks both x1 and x2 and one that attacks both y1 and y2.
Success, should a be “in”, is that either both x1 and x2 are out or both y1 and
y2 are out.
The attacks of Figure 31 can be described in CN by the clauses:
1. a→ Nb
2. b→ Na
3. a→ N(x1 ∨ x2)
∨
N(y1 ∨ y2)
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9.2 Comparison with Gabbay’s paper: Modal Provability
Foundations for Argumentation Networks
In 2009, Gabbay [31] asked a simple question:
(Q2009) Given an argumentation networkA = (S,R), what is its logical content
ΓA in terms of some reasonable logic L?
Gabbay answered this question using a version of a modal logic of provability
called LN1. The similarity with our paper is clear. We associate a modal logic
CNN and a theory ΓA with A. The view of [31] is that ΓA is the theory
satisfying more or less (for accuracy see [31]) the equivalence below:
ΓA ↔ (
∧
x
(x↔
∧
i
♦(ΓA ∧ ¬yi))
where yi are all the attackers of x in A.
In words: the logical content Γ says that x is in iff it is possible, from the
point of view of Γ, to have all the attackers of x out/false. This is a fixed point
equation for Γ.
The above is the idea of [31]. Once [31] develops the semantics for the logic,
we end up with a three point linear modal logic (t1, t2, t3), with t1 the actual
world and tj accessible to tj−1, j = 3, 2. In other words we have t1 < t2 < t3,
where “<” is the modal accessibility relation.
The labelling obtained from such a model is the following, where the triple
(v1, v2, v3) indicates the respective values in worlds (t1, t2, t3):
in = (>,>,>)
out = (⊥,⊥,⊥)
und = (>,⊥,>)
und* = (>,⊥,⊥)
As you can see, [31] has a completely different point of view, and furthermore,
the point of view of [31] can get two types of undecided! Comparing with our
current paper we have a classical point of view, and have a two worlds linear
modal logic, where the assignment is restricted like in intuitionistic logic, giving
rise to the following labelling with only one type of undecided:
in = (>,>)
out = (⊥,⊥)
und = (⊥,>)
To obtain a better comparison, let us organise the worlds t1, t2, t3 in different
accessibility ordering, say <∗:
t2 <
∗ t3 <∗ t1.
The four possible values can now be seen as in Figure 32
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Figure 33:
For the ordering t2 <
∗ t3 <∗ t1, the assignments are clearly intuitionistic.
True continues to be true in this ordering.
Consider now the loop of Figure 33.
In this loop b attacks itself , so its degree of undecided must be possibly
different from the degrees of the other points in the loop and must be in the
middle, equally away from the value “in” and from the value “out”. Indeed
paper [31] can distinguish between the node b being undecided and the other
nodes . There is a problem, however, in this case. There are only two values
of undecided , und and und*, and so there is no middle, so what value do we
give b? Paper [31] calculates the values according to its fixed point semantics
rationale and gives b the value und, while the value of a is und* and the value
of c is also und. Thus according to [31], we get:
a = (⊥,⊥,>), b = c = (⊥,>,>).
We, however, would like to give b the other value of undecided, namely
b = (⊥,⊥,>), and so we have to give c = (⊥,>,>) and have a = b.We can offer
the following rationale for these values:
1. x being undecided means that x can go either way, to be in or be out, but
is neither, i.e. x 6= (>,>,>), x 6= (⊥,⊥,⊥).
2. Different vectors for undecided relate to how likely x is to be in or out.
So when comparing the sequences (⊥,>,>) with (⊥,⊥,>), the less “>”
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we have in the sequence, the nearer “out” = (⊥,⊥,⊥) is the value of the
sequence.
3. In Figure 33, we need to choose the value for b. Paper [31] adopted a
generous credulous view for letting an argument x to be in, namely that
x is in if it is possible for all its attackers y to be out. Our view in this
paper is more skeptical and strict, it is that x is in if all attackers y are
strongly out (Ny holds). So if paper [31] calculated that b = (⊥,>,>), and
our view is different , then we might consider the other undecided value,
namely b = (⊥,⊥,>). This option agrees with the equational approach,
(see Remark 9.1 below) and so we choose (contrary to [31]), to take the
value of b to be (⊥,⊥,>).
4. c is attacked by b, which is nearer b = out, so c must be still undecided,
but nearer the value in. So we expect c to have the value (⊥,>,>)
5. From (4) we expect a to be still undecided but nearer the value out and
so our only option is to have a = b = (⊥,⊥,>).
The comparison and discussion of the rationale above suggests that we can
look at logics like CNNk, where k2 defined by chains of worlds of the form
w1 <
∗ w2 <∗, . . . , <∗ wk.
The undecided values can be of the form
und∗j = (⊥, . . . ,⊥,>, . . . ,>)
where 1 < j ≤ k and the value is ⊥ until position k − 1 and > afterwards.
We reserve the study of CNNk for Part 2 of this paper.
Remark 9.1 Note that the equational approach of [39] also supports our anal-
ysis and choice of value for b. In this approach we solve the following equations
of the nework of Figure 33.
1. b = (1− b)(1− a)
2. c = (1− b)
3. a = (1− c)
From (2) and (3) we get
4. a = b
Substituting in (1) we get
5. a = (1− a)2
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which solves to a = b = 0.38 and c = 0.62.
This is in agreement with our analysis provided we understand undecided as
numerical value strictly between 0 and 1 and nearer out to mean a numerical
value nearer to 0.
We can also view the equational approach as a CNN∞ approach, where the
possible worlds intuitionistic model is taken to be [0, 1], with 0 the actual world
and the value x = k for x ∈ S and k ∈ [0, 1] means
• y  x iff x ≤ k
Again, this connection will be investigated in Part 3 of this paper.
9.3 Comparison with David Pearce logic
We compare our logic CNN with Pearce’s logic of [25]. Pearce introduced
his logic in 1995 in the context of studying Answer Set Programming (ASP).
Pearce ’s logic is very similar to our logic and so we need to offer a comparison.
Furthermore, Pearce did apply his logic to argumentation.3 In Pearce’s own
words [30], equilibrium logic N5 provides
1. a general methodology for building nonmonotonic logics;
2. a logical and mathematical foundation for ASP-type systems, enabling
one to prove useful metatheroetic properties;
3. further means of comparing ASP with other approaches to nonmonotonic
reasoning.
The semantics for Pearce’s logic uses the same two possible worlds linear
model which we use, namely an actual world, t, a possible world s, with the
restriction on atoms q that if t  q then s  q. The difference between us and
Pearce is in what we actually do with this semantics.
In order to be able to compare the two logics, we need to agree on notation.
Our approach and notation so far can be summarised as follows:
Comments Group 1. The model has two worlds, t and s. t is the acutral
world and s is possible relative to t. For atomic q we have t  q implies s  q.
1. Our view is that this model is a modal semantics model with two possible
worlds linearly ordered whose atomic assignments satisfy a restriction.
2. Pearce’s view is that this model is an intuitionistic Kripke model with two
worlds (Go¨del’s logic with two worlds). This semantics is well known and
can be axiomatised. See [30].
3 The following is a private communication from David Pearce:
“Equilibrium logic was designed to capture stable reasoning and, not surprisingly, you can
apply it to capture stable extensions in argumentation theory. Together with other colleagues
we were able to show how to capture stable extensions in assumption-based argumentation.
However, including strong negation would be a new topic.”
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Comments Group 2. We use the connectives ¬ (classical negation),→ (clas-
sical implication) and modality N . We also use ∧ and ∨.
The semantical conditions are
1. t  ¬A iff t 6 A
2. t  A→ B iff (t  A implies t  B)
3. Same as above for s
4. t  NA iff s  ¬A
5. s  NA iff t  ¬A
6. x  A ∨B iff x  A or x  B, x ∈ {t, s}
7. x  A ∧B iff x  A and x  B, x ∈ {t, s}
Comments Group 3. Pearce uses intiutionistic connectives and Nelson strong
negation. He calls his system N5, the logic of here and there. To describe
Pearce’s system N5, let us use the notation below to distinguish the intuition-
istic connectives from the classical ones and to distinguish N5 from CNN. Let
us use the following:
1. “¬¬” for intuitionistic negation. Its semantic satisfaction condition is
• t  ¬¬A iff t 6 A and s 6 A
• s  ¬¬A iff s 6 A
(Note that for atoms we have t  A implies s  A!)
2. “⇒” for intuitionistic implication with the semantic conditions
• t  A⇒ B iff (t  A implies s  B) and (s  A implies s  B)
• s  A⇒ B iff (s  A implies s  B).
3. Use ∧ and ∨ with the same semantic conditions as Comment 2.6 and 2.7
respectively.
4. Note that for wffs with ∧,∨,¬¬ and ⇒ we have
•  A implies s  A
5. Pearce adds strong negation “∼” to the system N5 in a similar way to the
way we added N in Section 1. With each atom q, Pearce adds another
atom ∼ q and adds the axiom ∼ q ⇒ ¬¬q.
Thus N5 is the intuitionistic theory {∼ q → ¬¬q} based on the atoms
{q,∼ q|q atomic}. Note that for us in CN, we added Nq with the axiom
Nq → ¬q and we have t  Nq iff s  ¬q. This implies that if ¬q ∧ Nq
holds at t then ¬¬q holds at t.
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Just like we did for N in allowing N to apply to any wff and pushing N through
to the atoms, Pearce does a similar thing for ∼. ∼ satisfies the following rules
both at t and at s:
• ∼ (A ∧B) iff ∼ A∨ ∼ B
• ∼ (A ∨B) iff ∼ A∧ ∼ B
• ∼ A⇒ B) iff A∧ ∼ B
• ∼ (¬¬A) iff A
• ∼∼ A iff A.
These rules for “∼” allow us to push “∼” right in front of the atoms.
Comments Group 4. Comparison so far is as follows:
1. Both “∼” and “N” associate with any atom q the atom ∼ q or Nq respec-
tively. Both ∼ and N can be pushed down to the atoms syntactically. N ,
however, directly changes the world it is evaluated in. It is a true explicit
modality. In comparison, ∼ remains in the same world. It basically adds
a strong atom ∼ q to any atom q, but ∼ q is evaluated semantically in the
same world. It can push the evaluation to another world only through the
axioms ∼ ¬¬q ⇒ q and ∼ q ⇒ ¬¬q and this is a roundabout way of doing
it.
Our logic CNN also added with each atom q another atom Nq, but Nq
connects with an accessible world where q must be false.
2. Pearce moves from world t to world s using ¬¬ and⇒. We move from t to
s using N . We can also move from s to t using N . Pearce has no direct
connective which can move the evaluation from world s to world t.
Comments Group 5. To further compare CNN and N5, let us define the
intuitionisitc connectives in our logic CNN.
1. We let
¬¬X = def.¬X ∧NX
(X ⇒ Y ) = def (X → Y ) ∧N(X ∧ ¬Y ∧Ny).
2. Let A and B be two wffs built up from the atoms and the above connectives
¬¬ and⇒ and ∧ and ∨, as defined in Comment 5.1 above. In other words,
we have a sublanguage INN of CNN with wffs defined as follows:
• atoms q are in INN
• If A and B are in INN then so are A ∧B and A ∨B
• if A and B are in INN, so are
(¬A ∧NA), this is ¬¬A
and
(A→ B) ∧N(A ∧ ¬B ∧NB), this is A⇒ B.
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3. We now check and see that the truth conditions of intuitionistic semantics
hold for these translations (i.e. the condition in Comment 3.4 holds).
(3.1) For atomic q the condition t  q implies s  q holds.
(3.2) Assume by induction that the condition in Comment 3.4 (t  X implies
s  X) holds for X = A and X = B. We show that it holds for A∧B and
A ∨B. This is immediate.
(3.3) Assume that the condition in Comment 3.4 holds for A and we show that
the condition in Comment 3.4 holds for ¬¬A. We have
• t  ¬¬A iff (by definition) t  ¬A ∧ NA iff t  ¬A and s  ¬A iff
t 6 A and s 6 A.
We also have
s 6 A iff s 6 A and t 6 A
(because our inductive hypothesis was that Comment 3.4 holds, i.e.
t  A implies s  A)
iff s  ¬A and s  NA iff s  ¬A ∧NA iff (by definition) s  ¬¬A.
• We show now that if t  ¬¬A then s  ¬¬A. We have: t  ¬¬A iff
t  ¬A ∧NA. This implies s 6 A and we have seen before that this
is equivalent to s  ¬¬A.
(3.4) We now check the case of A ⇒ B. Assume by induction that t  X
implies s  X holds for X = A and for X = B. We show that the
semantic condition of Comment 3.2 holds for A ⇒ B and that also if
t  A⇒ B holds then s  A⇒ B also holds. We have
• t  A ⇒ B iff (by definition) t  (A → B) ∧ N(A ∧ ¬B ∧ NB)
iff t  A → B and s  (¬(A ∧ ¬B) ∨ ¬NB iff (t  A → B and
s  A→ B) or (t  A→ B and s  ¬NB).
But s  ¬NB iff t  B. So we have that: t  A → B iff t  (A →
B) ∨B.
Therefore we can continue
t  A⇒ B iff (t  A→ B and s  A→ B)∨ (t  A→ B and t  B).
But t  B implies s  B and we continue
iff t  (A → B) ∧ s  A → B). This is the correct condition for the
case of t.
We check s. s  A ⇒ B iff by definition s  (A → B) and s 
N(A ∧ ¬B) iff s  (A→ B) and t  A→ B.
Given the above, we now show that
• s  A⇒ B iff s  A then s  B
If s  A⇒ B then by the above s  A→ B and so if s  A then s  B.
If s  A implies s  B then s  A→ B. So the only option for s 6 A⇒ B
is that s 6 N(A∧¬B∧NB) and so t  A∧¬B∧NB. But then this implies
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by the condition of Comment 3.4 for A that s  A ∧ ¬B, contradicting
what we have just assumed that s  A→ B.
There remain to show A ⇒ B satisfies the condition of Comment 3.4. This is
obvious, however, from the semantic condition of satisfaction for “⇒”.
(3.5) We summarise the results of the current item (Comment 5.3). We have just
shown that CNN contains the intuitionistic part of N5 as the fragment
INN (we defined the intuitionistic negation and intuitionistic implication
in our system and shown they behave correctly). The reader can verify
that the law of excluded middle for this embedded intuitionistic fragment
does not hold, so the fragment is not trivial, ( i.e. q ∨ (¬q ∧Nq) is not a
theorem of CNN, take q = (⊥,>)).
We now ask, can we also define “∼” as well using N?
Let us check. We need a formula of CNN, say α(q), which will act as the
connective ∼, namely
∼ q = (by definition) α(q)
This formula must satisfy
(a) For atomic q, α(q)⇒ ¬¬q
(b) For any formula A of INN, α(¬¬A)⇔ A
If the value of q is taken to be (⊥,>) or (>,>), we get because of (a).
and the fact that in this case the value of ¬¬q is (⊥,⊥), that the value of
α(q) must be (⊥,⊥). To summarise we must have (c) and (d). to hold
(c) α(⊥,>) = (⊥,⊥)
(d) α(>,>) = (⊥,⊥)
but if we have this , how can (b) hold? For both cases where value of q is
taken to be (⊥,>) or (>,>), the value of ¬¬q is the same and so how can
we have
α(¬¬q)⇔ q?
The only way out is to say that rule (b) is a syntactical reduction, making
∼ not a real connective. O.K. this is acceptable but different from our
logic where N is a connective. So (b) holds syntactically, this means that
(a) has to hold by a restriction on the assignment of the formal syntactical
atom “∼ q”. The only way to it is to take “∼ q” to be the same as “¬¬q”.
This is fine except that when we iterate to have
¬¬¬¬q ⇒ q.
The first “¬¬” is not a connective but a syntactical rewrite operator and
only the second ¬¬ is a connective and the implication is valid. This is
not a problem because we will write it syntactically as ∼ ¬¬q ⇒ q and the
“∼” will rewrite the following “¬¬” out , leaving only q ⇒ q.
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Comments Group 6. We now start with N5 as our given intuitionistic sys-
tem with {¬¬,⇒,∧,∨,∼} and the semantics as described in [30] and in (Com-
ment Group 3) above and check whether we can define CN using the connectives
of N5. We need to define N and the classical connectives {¬,→,∧,∨}. We show
that this is not possible. Consider the formula of CN.
• ¬(q ∧Nq), q atomic.
This formula is always true at world t but can be false at world s (for q = > at
s and at t).
No intuitionisitc wff, even with “∼” can be true at t and false at s. Therefore
N and ¬ are not definable in Pearce’s logic.
It may still be possible to translate argumentation networks into N5 using
its strong negation. We leave this study to part 2 of our paper.
9.4 Comparison with four meta-level approach papers [32,
35, 36, 37] and [45]
To compare with papers of Dvorak et al., Doutre et al., and Grossi, we need some
preliminary methodological discussion about interpretations and translations.
All the above papers translate argumentation networks into other systems and
so to explain what they are doing and compare with our paper we need a
framework of reference, a matrix schema for comparison.
Consider the schematic Figure 34. This figure is a schema for possible em-
beddings, containing four systems. We name the system and give examples to
help the reader visualise the schema. We then discuss options for interpreta-
tions in general and then explain how the papers we are discussing fall into the
schema of Figure 34. Once we understand how these papers fit into the schema,
our comparison will be concluded.
In Figure 34, the top left circle is a system T. Think of T as classical logic
and think of x, e, y′ as formulas of classical logic. Think of T+ as an extension
of T, say if T is classical logic then T+ extends T with monadic second order
quantification.
The system S1 can be interpreted into T. Say x is mapped to x
′ (the arrows
indicate the mapping) and y is mapped to y′. Think of S+ as an extension of S.
Say S = intuitionistic propositional logic and S+ is some extension of it. The
element e in T is not a result of the mapping of S into T. It has no source in
S. Similarly S2 is mapped into T and S
+
2 extends S2. T
+ can be mapped into
an extension S+2 of S2. If not all of T
+ is mapped, at least some of it, say α, is
mapped onto α′.
Think of S2 as modal logic, mapped into classical logic. Think of α as a
quantifier of second order, which is realised/mapped as extending modal logic
(as a new modality α?, for example).
The systems E and E+ are mapped into modal logic. Think, for example,
of E as a substructural logic or a default system or some normative system or
as an argumentation system being interpreted in modal logic.
We now discuss possible properties of such embeddings.
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Figure 34:
Type 1: encapsulation of S in T. This type gives names in T to the
elements of S and mirrors in T in all the movements of S. It is like embed-
ding S in T using Go¨del numbers. Such encapsulation is used in translating
systems into classical logic in order to use Theorem Proving machines to talk
about/manipulate S. None of the papers involved above are pure encapsulation.
Encapsulation is very general, S can be a recipe for making pizzas and T can
just talk about it. T’s role in encapsulation is that of a Turing machine.
Type 2: Meta-level embedding of S into T. This type is most common.
The language T describes in a meaningful way the system S. T acts as a meta-
level language describing S by internally mirroring S. To understand how this
works, think of a mathematical theory modelling some physical phenomenon,
say in an equational model governing the motion of a planet around the sun.
The meta-theory T describing modelling S (e.g. argumentation) in this way is
not supposed to provide a meaning (semantics) for what it describes. It is just
supposed to provide a formal language of accurate description of S, allow one
to describe variation of S and enable the use of properties and tools available
in T to investigate S (very common is to use T for complexity issues for S).
Of course, one tends to use T which is well known, general enough and well
investigated and well endowed with tools.
To summarise Type 2.
(P1) T describes S from the meta-level point of view but does not give S any
meaning.
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(P2) T can describe at the same time several different S1,S2 and so can serve
as an environment for suggesting combinations of S1 and S2. For exam-
ple, if T is classical logic and S1 is modal logic and S2 is intuitionistic
logic, then embedding S1 and S2 into T, may suggest how to formulate
modal intuitionistic logics.
(P3) Any tool available for T can be used for S. So for example, andy com-
plexity studies for classical logic can be used for modal logic through the
embedding of modal logic inside classical logic.
(P4) New research ideas can be imported from T to S. Some may be inter-
esting for S and some may be just mathematics hacks of no interest.
The paper of Dvorak et al., paper [35] is an example of this. The formal
mathematical language is second order monadic first order logic. This can serve
as the modelling language for the majority, if not all, of the varieties of argu-
mentation networks. It is intended by the authors to be to argumentation like
ALGOL is to algorithms. It is an exact mathematical logic language strong
enough to express whatever you want to say about argumentation networks. To
quote the authors of [35] own words:
Begin quote.
We propose the formalism of monadic second order logic (MSO) as
a unifying framework for representing and reasoning with various
semantics of abstract argumentation. We express a wide range of
semantics within the proposed framework, including the standard
semantics due to Dung, semi-stable, stage, cf2, and resolution-based
semantics. We provide building blocks which make it easy and
straightforward to express further semantics and reasoning tasks.
Our results show that MSO can serve as a lingua franca for abstract
argumentation that directly yields to complexity results. In par-
ticular, we obtain that for argumentation frameworks with certain
structural properties the main computational problems with respect
to MSO-expressible semantics can all be solved in linear time. Fur-
thermore, we provide a novel characterisation of resolution-based
grounded semantics.
.
.
.
Starting with the seminal work by Dung, the area of argumenta-
tion has evolved to one of the most active research branches within
Artificial Intelligence. Dung’s abstract argumentation frameworks,
where arguments are seen as abstract entities which are just in-
vestigated with respect to how they relate to each other, in terms
of “attacks”, are nowadays well understood and deferent semantics
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(i.e., the selection of sets of arguments which are jointly acceptable)
have been proposed. In fact, there seems to be no single “one suits
all” semantics, but it turned out that studying a particular setting
within various semantics and to compare the results is a central re-
search issue within the field. Different semantics give rise to different
computational problems, such as deciding whether an argument is
acceptable with respect to the semantics under consideration, that
require different approaches for solving these problems.
This broad range of semantics for abstract argumentation demands
for a unifying framework for representing and reasoning with the
various semantics. Such a unifying framework would allow us to see
what the various semantics have in common, in what they differ,
and ideally, it would offer generic methods for solving the compu-
tational problems that arise within the various semantics. Such a
unifying framework should be general enough to accommodate most
of the significant semantics, but simple enough to be decidable and
computationally feasible.
End quote
Properties (P1)–(P4) mentioned above hold for this case. See also the dis-
cussion in Section 5.1 above. Our own interpretation is object level and gives
the argumentation network a meaning in terms of strong negation N . As we
mention in Section 5.1, the meta-level interpretation has to translate “x attacks
y” as is, by providing a predicate letter “R” for attack and write xRy. The
meta-level interpretation does not give a meaning to R. Our interpretation
writes x → Ny for the attack of x on y. So when x and y are instantiated by,
e.g., wffs x = α and y = β, we get a meaning for the attack of α on β, namely
the meaning our logic gives to α → Nβ. The paper of Dvorak cannot write
“αRβ”, but even if it could do so, it would have to wait for us to say to Dvorak
et al. what we mean by “α attacks β” and then Dvorak et al. would try to say
it formally in monadic second order classical logic.
The other paper of Dvorak, paper [36], also provides a more propositional
meta-language to describe more tightly higher level argumentation network.
Properties (P1)–(P4) above still apply. The emphasis here is on (P3).
To quote the authors’ own words:
Begin quote:
This paper reconsiders Modgil’s Extended Argumentation Frame-
works (EAFs) that extend Dung’s abstract argumentation frame-
works by attacks on attacks. This allows to encode preferences di-
rectly in the framework and thus also to reason about the preferences
themselves. As a first step to reduction-based approaches to imple-
ment EAFs, we give an alternative (but equivalent) characterisation
of acceptance in EAFs. Then we use this characterisation to pro-
vide EAF encodings for answer set programming and propositional
logic. Moreover, we address an open complexity question and the
58
expressiveness of EAFs.
End quote.
The authors of [36] use propositional encoding of the argumentation net-
work. This is still meta-level. To explain briefly what is the difference: while
predicate logic would formalise “x attacks y” as “xRy”, using a predicate R, the
propositional encoding uses a propositional atom rx,y. You need a new atom
for each pair x, y. So rx,y = > means that x does attack y and rx,y = ⊥ means
that x does not attack y.
So for example to formalise:
• (For all x), if (x is “in” iff all its attackers are “out”)
We can write in predicate logic:
• ∀x[Qin(x)↔ ∀y(yRx→ Qout(y))]
or in propositional logic
• ∧x∈S [x↔ ∧y∈S(rx,y → ¬y)].
The advantage of the use of rx,y is that we can say directly that x does not
attack y, i.e. we can write ¬rx,y. Our logic CNN cannot do that. Although we
can represent in our logic “x attacks y” as “x → Ny” and use it to calculate
extensions, we cannot represent “x does not attack y” as “¬(x→ Ny)”, because
x may be out, i.e. ¬x is true, and so x → Ny is true, even though x does not
attack y. We shall remedy this in Part 2 of this paper. Note also that using
direct naming of attacks via xRy or rx,y we can also formalise higher level
attacks of the form z attacks rx,y.
So to summarise, paper [36] is also a meta-level interpretation geared towards
supplying algorithms.
The paper of Doutre et al. [32] is also meta-level, using propositional logic.
It is also geared towards algorithms. To quote the authors:
Begin quote:
We provide a logical analysis of abstract argumentation frameworks
and their dynamics. Following previous work, we express attack re-
lation and argument status by means of propositional variables and
define acceptability criteria by formulas of propositional logic. We
here study the dynamics of argumentation frameworks in terms of
basic operations on these propositional variables, viz. change of their
truth values. We describe these operations in a uniform way with
in well known variant of propositional Dynamic Logic PDF: the Dy-
namic Logic of Propositional Assignments, DL-PA. The atomic pro-
grams of DL-PA are assignments of propositional variables to truth
values, and complex programs can be built by means of the connec-
tives of sequential and nondeterministic composition and test. We
start by showing that in DL-PA, the construction of extensions can
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be performed by a DL-PS program that is parameterized by the def-
inition of acceptance. We then mainly focus on how the acceptance
of one or more arguments can be enforced and show that this can be
achieved by changing the truth values of the propositional variables
describing the attack relation in a minimal way.
End quote.
The paper of Grossi [37] is also meta-level, but it uses modal logic as the
meta-level language. The schematic situation is described in Figure 34 by the
embedding schema of [E and E+] into [S2 and S
+
2 ] which in turn are embedded
into [T and T+]. Here E is argumentation networks, S2 is modal logic, S
+
2 is
an expansion which contains extra connectives of modal logic to compensate for
the lack of quantifiers. T is classical predicate logic. α is the extra “quantifier”
connectives imported by Grossi into modal logic to enable Grossi to interpret
argumentation. The basic modal accessibility is taken by Grossi to be the inverse
of the attack relation:
• x attacks y means x is an accessible world to y.
The situation is best described by Grossi’s own words below. You can immedi-
ately see that Grossi focusses on the (P4) aspects of the translation:
Begin quote:
The paper presents a study of abstract argumentation theory from
the point of view of modal logic. The key thesis upon which the
paper builds is that argumentation frameworks can be studied as
Kripke frames. This simple observation allows us to import a num-
ber of techniques and results from modal logic to argumentation
theory, and opens up new interesting avenues for further research.
The paper gives a glimpse of the sort of techniques that can be
imported, discussing complete calculi for argumentation, adequate
model-checking and bisimulation games and sketches an agent for
future research at the interface of modal logic and argumentation
theory.
End quote.
The paper of Besnard, Doutre and Herzig, Encoding argument graphs in
logic is a meta-level paper discussing properties (specification) which any meta-
level interpretation should satisfy. For example, the interpretations of papers
[32, 35, 36, 37] should be checked to see if they satisfy the principles outlined in
paper [45]. Paper [45] is a meta-meta-level paper. We quote the authors’ own
description of their paper:
Begin quote.
Argument graphs are a common way to model argumentative rea-
soning. For reasoning or computational purposes, such graphs may
have to be encoded in a given logic. This paper aims at provid-
ing a systematic approach for this encoding. This approach relies
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upon a general, principle-based characterisation of argumentation
semantics.
In order to provide a method to reason about argument graphs [47],
Besnard and Doutre first proposed encodings of such graphs and
semantics in propositional logic [46]. Further work by different au-
thors following the same idea was published later . . . However, all
these approaches wee devoted to specific cases in the sense that for
each semantics, a dedicated encoding was proposed from scratch.
We aim here at a generalisation, by defining a systematic approach
to encoding argument graphs (which are digraphs) and their seman-
tics in a logic `. Said differently, our objective is to capture the
extensions under a given semantics of an argument graph in a given
logic (be it propositional logic or any other logic). We hence gen-
eralise the approach originally introduced in [46] by parametrizing
the encoding in various ways, including principles defining a given
semantics.
We consider abstract arguments first, and then provide guidelines to
extend the approach to structured arguments (made up of a support
that infers a conclusion).
End quote.
9.5 Comparison with the paper [34] of Arieli and Cami-
nada
To explain what Arieli and Caminada are doing and to evaluate and compare
it with our paper, let us start with the meta-level point of view of Dvorak [35]
and the discussion in Section 5.1 above. We know that the Caminada labelling
has three values {in, out, und}. The meta-level approach which interprets argu-
mentation in monadic second order classical predicate logic, would use variables
x, y, z . . . for arguments and the binary predicate R for the attack relation and
three unary predicates Q1, Q0 and Q? for the values in, out and undecided re-
spectively. See section 5.1. The axioms of ∆(R,Q0, Q1, Q?) say in predicate
logic, among other things, that each x gets exactly one value. We are now
ready to lead, step by step, from the above to the Arieli and Caminada paper.
Let us start from a given (S,R). For each a ∈ S, consider Q1(a), Q0(a) and
Q?(a) as atomic propositions of the classical propositional calculus. Since these
are all connected with the letter “a” we can change notation and write
• a+ for Q1(a)
• a− for Q0(a)
• a? for Q?(a)
Since we know that exactly one of the above can be true, we can forget about
a? and use only the pair (a+, a−). We have:
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• If a is in, then we have a+ = >, a− = ⊥.
• If a is out we have a+ = ⊥, a− = >.
• If a = undecided, we have a+ = ⊥, a− = ⊥.
We must add the restriction that we can never have both a+ = > and a− = >.
We thus have turned the logic with Q1(x), Q0(x), Q?(x) into a three-valued
logic with values t = (1, 0), f = (0, 1) and ? = (0, 0), where these values mean
as follows:
• x = t means x is “in”, or equivalently x+ = > and x− = ⊥ or equivalently
(x+, x−) = (>,⊥) or equivalently Q1(x) ∧ ¬Q0(x) = >.
• x = f means x is “out”, or equivalently x+ = ⊥ and x− = > or equiva-
lently (x+, x−) = (⊥,>) or equivalently ¬Q1(x) ∧Q0(x) = >.
• x =? means x is undecided or equivalently x+ = x− = ⊥ or equivalently
(x+, x−) = (⊥,⊥) or equivalently ¬Q1(x) ∧ ¬Q0(x) = >.
The value x+ = x− = > is forbidden.
We now have a propositional calculus with three values {t, f , ?} and a reduc-
tion of each proposition x into two propositions x+, x−, such that x = (x+, x−)
and the restriction on the assignments on {x+, x−|x ∈ S} which says that
x+ = x− = > is forbidden.
If we add to this version of classical propositional calculus quantifiers over
propositions ∀x, ∃x, x ∈ S, we get the system of [34].
We can also turn the pairs (x+, x−) into a lattice calculus. Note that we
have
x = (x+, x−) = (say) (x1, x2)
¬x = (x−, x+) = (x2, x1).
But also we can write similarly for y and get:
x = Q1(x) ∧ ¬Q0(x) = (x1, x2)
y = Q1(y) ∧ ¬Q0(y) = (y1, y2).
Therefore
x ∧ y = Q1(x) ∧Q1(y) ∧ ¬Q0(x) ∧ ¬Q0(y)
= Q1(x) ∧Q1(y) ∧ ¬(Q0(x) ∨Q0(y))
We therefore get as a rule of the calculus
(x1, x2) ∧ (y1, y2) = (x1 ∧ y1, x2 ∨ y2).
We get other rules in a similar fashion.4
Now that we have reduced the idea of [34] to the meta-level system of [35],
we can read the quotation word by word from [34] and understand it in a new
light. We have changed the notation slightly. [34] uses “⊥” for undecided, we
use “?” so as not to confuse our readers.
Begin quote.
4In Part 2 we shall compare with Gabbay’s 1985 (published in 2012 as [40]).
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Three-valued Semantics and Signed Formulas. As indicated
previously, our purpose in this paper is to provide a this, logic-based,
perspective on argumentation frameworks, and to relate it to the
two other points of view presented in the two previous subsections.
[Gabbay note: these are 2.1: Extension based semantics and 2.2:
labelling based semantics.] In this section we define the framework
for doing so, using signed theories. Following [41], we introduce these
theories in the context of three-valued semantics (see leo [43]).
Consider the truth values t (‘true’), f (‘false’) and ? (‘neither true
nor false’). A natural ordering, reflecting differences in the ‘measure
of truth’ of else elements, is f <? < t. The meet (minimum) ∧,
join (maximum) ∨ and the order reversing involution ¬, define by
¬t = f,¬f = t and ¬? =?, are taken to be the basic operators on ≤
for defining eh conduction, disjunction, and the negation connectives
(respectively) of Kleene’s well-known three-valued logic (see [44]).
Another operator which will be useful in the sequel is defined as
follows: a ⊃ b = t if ∈ {f, ?} and a ⊃ b = b otherwise (see [42]
for some explanations why this operator is useful for defining an
implication connective). The truth tales of these basic connectives
are given below.
∨ t f ?
t t t t
f t f ?
? t ? ?
∧ t f ?
t t f ?
f f f f
? ? f ?
⊃ t f ?
t f f ?
f t t t
? t t t
¬
t f
f t
? ?
The truth values may also be represented by pairs of two-valued
components of the lattice ({0, 1}, 0 < 1) as follows: t = (1, 0), f =
(0, 1), ? = (0, 0). This representation may be intuitively understood
as follows: If a formula ψ is assigned the value (x, y), then x indicates
whether ψ should be accepted and y indicates whether ψ should be
rejected. As shown in the next lemma, the basic operators considered
above may also be expressed in terms of this representation by pairs.
Lemma 11. Let x1, x2, y1, y2 ∈ {0, 1}. Then:
(x1, y1) ∨ (x2, y2) = (x1 ∨ x2, y1 ∧ y2),
(x1, y1) ∧ (x2, y2) = (x1 ∧ x2, y1 ∨ y2),
(x1, y1) ⊃ (x2, y2) = (¬x1 ∨ x2, x1 ∧ y2),
¬(x, y) = (y, x).
In our context, the three values above are used for evaluating for-
mulas in a propositional language L, consisting of a set of atomic
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formulas Atoms(L), the propositional constants t and f, and logical
symbols ¬,∧,∨,⊃. We denote the atomic formulas of L by p, q, r,
formulas by ψ, φ and sets of formulas (theories) by T ,S. the set
of all atoms occurring in a formula ψ is denoted by Atoms(ψ) and
Atoms(T ) = {Atoms(ψ)|ψ ∈ T is the set of all the atoms occurring in
the theory T . Now, a valuation v i s a function that assigns to each
atomic formula a truth value from {t, f, ?}, and v(t) = t, v(f) = f .
Any valuation is extended to complex formulas in the obvious way.
In particular, v(ψ ◦ φ) = v(ψ) ◦ v(φ) for every ◦ ∈ {¬,∧,∨,⊃}. A
valuation v satisfies ψ off v(ψ) = t. A valuation that satisfies every
formula in T is a model of T . The set of models of T is denoted by
mod(T ).
Definition 12. Let L be a propositional language with set of
atoms Atoms(L). A signed alphabet Atoms±(L) is a set that consists
of two symbols p+, p− for each atom p ∈ Atoms(C). The language
over Atoms±(L) is denoted by L±. A value v for L± is called co-
herent, if there is no p ∈ Atoms(L) such that both v(p+) = 1 and
v(p−) = 1.
End quote.
We now compare with our system CN. We have a two world modal intu-
itionistic logic and our values are
• x = in means x ∧ ¬Nx
• x = out means ¬x ∧Nx
• x = undecided means ¬x ∧ ¬Nx
If we let x+ = x and x− = Nx, we get the system of Arieli and Caminada
• x = in iff (x+, x−) = (>,⊥) iff x ∧ ¬Nx = >
• x = out iff (x+, x−) = (⊥,>) iff ¬x ∧Nx = >.
• x = und iff (x+, x−) = (⊥,⊥) iff ¬x ∧ ¬Nx = >
• (x+, x−) = (>,>) is not allowed. This means that x∧Nx is not allowed.
This is our intuitionistic restriction ` Nx→ ¬x.
To summarise the comparison, Arieli and Caminada turn argumentation
into a Kleene 3 valued logic and manipulate it in the meta-level using Arieli’s
[41, 42, 43] lattice theoretic methods. Our paper manipulates it in the object
level in a modal intuitionistic logic.
The perceptive reader might ask whether the paper of Arieli and Caminada
carries any message or point of view, beyond the mathematical manipulation of
truth values? In comparison, the message of our paper is that it is object level,
translating the attack relation xRy into x → Ny, where N is strong negation
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y1 = und1
x = what undecided?
ym = undm. . . ,
Figure 35:
embedded in a modal intuitionistic logic. What is the message of [34]? What
can it be used for? Our answer to this question is that the Arieli–Caminada
paper is very important in the context where a calculus of degrees of undecided
is needed. If we need to build an argumentation method for an application area
with many degrees of undecided, then we need a calculus for undecided values
and we can follow the lead of [34].
Consider Figure 35 . We need to be able to assign a value to x in Figure 35,
given the variety of undecided values of the attackers of x, namely y1, . . . , ym.
Our system CNN is not general enough for this purpose. We are com-
mitted to the intuitionistic restriction, so we can have undecided values like
(⊥,>,>,>), (⊥,⊥,>,>)(⊥,⊥,⊥,>) and no more, for a 4-world modal model.
The Arieli–Caminada approach can handle more, many more values, for exam-
ple they can have (⊥,>,⊥,>), etc.
Imagine a highly divergent group of witnesses of a tragic event. They are
all undecided and contradicting and unreliable for a multitude of reasons. The
traditional extension based semantics, as well as the Caminada labelling based
semantics will give them all undecided. This is not what we need. We need
a calculus of undecided that will tell us something better. The equational ap-
proach [39] will give numbers, the modal provability [31] might give us several
options for undecided, but these papers put forward fixed approaches derived
from a fixed points of view serving some other methodological aims. The fact
that they also yield several undecided values is only a side effect. Same applies
to our logic CNNk. These system are not intended as calculi for undecided
values and they offer no flexibility. We need an approach which can generate
alternative calculi of undecided which can be tailored for different applications.
The Arieli–Caminada paper is a start. We leave this research to a future paper.
It is regrettable that Arieli and Caminada took their paper in the (tradi-
tional) direction of generating extensions. It is time for all of us to get out of
this way of thinking, which is nothing but a barrier to our imagination.
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9.6 Comparing with paper [27] — Methods for solving
reasoning problems in abstract argumentation. A sur-
vey
[27] is an excellent survey of methods for computing extensions. It divides the
approaches into two:
1. Direct methods
2. Reduction methods, where the argumentation systems are translated into
other systems which have good computational facilities which can be used
to calculate extensions.
So the paper [27] considers translations only as means of calculating ex-
tensions. In comparison, we consider translations as means of giving new and
different meaning to the attack relation.
In the authors own words, for example, they say
Begin quote.
The underlying idea of the reduction approach is to exploit exist-
ing efficient software which has originally been developed for other
purposes. To this end, one has to formalize the reasoning problems
within other formalisms. . . In this approach, the resulting argumen-
tation systems directly benefit from the high level of sophistication
today’s systems reached. . . In the remainder of Section 3 we shall
present the concepts behind other reduction-based approaches, for
instance, the equational approach as introduced by Gabbay in [39]
and the reductions to monadic second order logic as proposed in [35].
We will not consider the vast collection of extensions to Dung’s
frameworks, like,5 value-based, bipolar, extended, constrained, tem-
poral, practical, and fibring argumentation frameworks, as well as ar-
gumentation frameworks with recursive attacks, argumentation con-
text systems, and abstract dialectical frameworks. We also exclude
abstract argumentation with uncertainty or weights here.
End quote.
So to continue our comparison with paper [27], we highlight the fact that the
interest of the authors of paper [27] in the current paper (as well as in papers
[35] and [39], for example) is limited solely to the question of how these papers
provide means to compute extensions.
10 Conclusion and future research
In this paper we introduced a modal logic CNN with strong negation N playing
the role of modality. The semantics has two possible worlds, here (actual world
5Editorial comment: We omit the references in this list
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t) and there (possible world s) with
t  NA iff s  ¬A
s  NA iff t  ¬A
and with the restriction that for atoms q we have
t  q implies s  q.
We showed how to translate any abstract argumentation frame A into CNN
via a theory ∆A of CNN in such a way that all the models of ∆A give exactly
the complete extensions of A.
Many properties and operations on A (such as joint attacks, higher level
attacks, bipolar argumentation, and more) become very simple when done in
CNN.
Further research postponed to Part 2 of this paper includes the following
topics:
1. Translate Assumption Based Argumentation (ABA) into CNN.
2. Use intuitionistic logic as a basis for CNN (call it INN) and see how to
obtain intuitionisitc based argumentation. In fact, given any logic L de-
fined by rules of the type used in ASPIC, we can form LNN and translate
ASPIC (for L) into LNN.
This will give us a better understanding of ASPIC and in fact also allow
us to define a generalisation of Assumption Based Argumentation.
3. Fully investigate ADF (Abstract Dialectical Frameworks) in CNN.
4. It is easy to define predicate argumentation using predicate CNN. Simply
use predicate CNN and allow instantiations of any (S,R) with classical
predicate wffs. Translate ϕ ψ as ϕ→ Nψ. The semantics of predicate
CNN will give us the complete extensions for the network.
5. Investigate bipolar networks and CNN, as discussed in CC7.
6. Investigate in detail iterated disjunctive attacks in CNN of the kind of
Figure 31.
7. The logic CNN is based on two possible worlds t (actual world) and s
(s is accessible to t). We can investigate the possibility of adding more
worlds to the chain, say use 3 worlds t (actual), s (accessible to t) and s′
(accessible to s).
Define
t  NA iff s  ¬A
s  NA iff s′  ¬A
s′  NA iff t  ¬A.
This new system (call it CNN3) might allow us to do the following:
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(a) have several grades of undecided, see the comparison in Section 9.2
(b) allow for attacks of a node x on another network Ax.
(c) allow us to use truth in the middle node as a meta-level vehicle to
express properties of extensions, (since NN refers to the actual world
from the middle node). We can force the models to yield, for example,
only preferred extensions.
(d) Investigate the connection with Logic Programming.
(e) allow us to formalise in the object level the notion of “x does not
attack y”.
8. Following the connection with Logic Programming and David Pearce’s
Equilibrium Logic [30], we investigate whether Pearce’s logic can imple-
ment argumentation network similarly to the way CNN does.
9. Extend the negation as failure approach of [40] to argumentation and
compare with this paper and with [34].
We shall investigate these possibilities in Part 2.
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Appendix: Formal definition of the modal logic
CNN
In this section , we change the syntax of CNN slightly. Besides the classical
connectives and the connective N , we add a constant t for the actual world.
This helps with completeness proofs. We should call, if we want to be strict ,
the modified system with the slightly different name, say, CNN*, but we are
not going to bother.
Definition 10.1 A model for CNN is a pair 〈{1, 2}, v〉 where v assigns subsets
of {1, 2} to atomic propositions such that if 1 ∈ v(p) then 2 ∈ v(p)
Definition 10.2 If M = 〈{1, 2}, v〉 is a model of CNN then define truth in M
as follows, (where m = 1, 2 and t is the propositional constant for world 1).
• M m p iff m ∈ v(p)
• M m >
• M 2m ⊥
• M m t iff m = 1
• M m ¬A iff M 2m A
• M m A ∧B iff M m A and M m B
• M m A ∨B iff M m A or M m B
• M m A→ B iff M 2m A or M m B
• M m NA iff either m = 1 and M 22 A, or m = 2 and M 21 A
Write M  A when M m A for all m (i.e. m = 1 or m = 2); write m A
when M m A for all M ; and write  A when M m A for every m and every
M .
Intuitively, a model is a finite linear ordering of worlds – in the sense of
familiar possible world semantics for modal logic – where logical connectives
are defined as usual and an atomic proposition p is true at a world, then it is
true at all ‘later’ worlds. The new connective N has the semantics that NA is
true at a world if and only if A is false as the ‘next’ world where, in the case of
72
interpreting N , ‘next’ cycles back to the first world at the last world (so NA is
true at the last world when A is false at the first).
The condition on atomic propositions ensures that N is a kind of negation,
at least for atomic propositions interpreted at the first world. If M 1 Np then
M 22 p and so M 21 p. Moreover the condition on interpreting N ensures that
M 1 NNp→ p as M 1 NNp implies M 21 Np implies M 1 p.
Definition 10.3 The theorems of CNN are defined as follows:
tautologies
(K) N(A ∧B)↔ NA ∨NB
(F ) ¬NA↔ N¬A
(C) A→ NNA
(A) t→ (p→ N¬p))
(T ) t↔ N t
A A→ B
B
(MP ) A
N¬A (N)
For a set Γ we write Γ ` A when there are A1 . . . An ∈ Γ such that ` (A1 ∧ · · · ∧
An)→ A.
Lemma 10.4 ` A→ B implies ` NB → NA, and ` A↔ B implies ` NA↔
NB,
Proof. The first part follows by the following derivation:
` A→ B assumption
` ¬(A ∧ ¬B) tautologies and (MP )
` N¬¬(A ∧ ¬B) (N)
` N(A ∧ ¬B) tautologies, (MP ) and (F )
` NA ∨N¬B (K)
` NA ∨ ¬NB tautologies, (MP ) and (F )
` NB → NA tautologies and (MP )
It is worth expanding one of the steps further: ` N¬¬C implies by (F ) that `
¬N¬C; also, ` ¬NC → N¬C is a consequence of (F ). So, using tautologies and
(MP ), ` ¬N¬C → ¬¬NC thence ` ¬N¬C → NC . Therefore ` N¬¬(A∧¬B)
implies ` N(A ∧ ¬B).
The rest of the lemma follows from the fact that A ↔ B is short for (A →
B) ∧ (B → A). 
Theorem 10.5 ` B ↔ C implies ` A[p/B]↔ A[p/C]
Proof. By induction on A using 10.4. 
Theorem 10.6  A iff CNN ` A
Proof. For the right-left direction it is a simple matter to verify, by induction
on derivations, that CNN ` A entails that for any M and any m, M m A.
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For the right left direction we argue that if Σ is consistent then there is an
M such that, for every A ∈ Σ, M m A for m = 1 and m = 2. First, since
CNN 0 A then using familiar methods, we can find a set Γ that is consistent
with respect to CNN and maximal in the sense that B ∈ Γ or B 6∈ Γ for every
B. Moreover, we have that Γ ` A implies A ∈ Γ
Now, consider the set ∆ = {B | N¬B ∈ Γ}. If B,¬B ∈ ∆ then both
N¬B ∈ Γ and N¬¬B ∈ Γ, and so by 10.5, (F ) and tautological reasoning,
¬NB,NB ∈ Γ which is impossible as Γ is consistent. Also, since ¬NB ∈ Γ or
NB ∈ Γ, it follows that N¬B ∈ Γ or NB ∈ Γ, and so B ∈ ∆ or ¬B ∈ ∆. We
conclude that ∆, like Γ, is maximal and consistent.
Now, by the definition of ∆ and the fact it is maximal consistent, NB ∈ Γ
implies B 6∈∆; and if NB 6∈Γ then N¬B ∈ Γ and so B ∈ ∆. Also, if B ∈ Γ then,
by (C), NNB ∈ Γ and so N¬¬B ∈ Γ which implies that ¬NB ∈ ∆ thence
NB 6∈∆; and conversely, if B 6∈Γ then ¬B ∈ Γ and so NN¬B ∈ Γ which implies
N¬NB ∈ Γ thence NB ∈ ∆. We conclude that
(†) B ∈ Γ iff NB 6∈∆ and B ∈ ∆ iff NB ∈ Γ
We now describe a model M using Γ and ∆. Suppose that t ∈ Γ, and set
v(p) = {1, 2} iff p ∈ Γ and v(p) = {2} iff p ∈ ∆. Then, as t ∈ Γ, if p ∈ Γ then
by (A), N¬p ∈ Γ and so p ∈ ∆. Thus M is indeed a model as defined in 10.1.
We now verify, by induction on A, that M 1 A iff A ∈ Γ and M 2 A iff
A ∈ ∆
• If A is atomic the result follows by the definition of M .
• If A is t then, by assumption, t ∈ Γ. Moreover, making use of (T ), t ∈ Γ
iff Nt ∈ Γ iff ¬Nt 6∈ Γ iff N¬t 6∈ Γ. If follows that t ∈ Γ iff t 6∈∆.
• If A is a truth functional connective (i.e. is not N), then the result follows
easily by the induction hypothesis and the maximal consistency of Γ and
∆.
• Suppose A is NB. Then using (†) above we have:
M 1 A iff M 1 NB
iff M 22 B
iff B 6∈∆ ind. hyp.
iff NB ∈ Γ (†)
iff A ∈ Γ
M 2 A iff M 2 NB
iff M 21 B
iff B 6∈ Γ ind. hyp.
iff NB ∈ ∆ (†)
iff A ∈ ∆
This completes the induction.
The argument is similar if we suppose t ∈ ∆. Therefore, if Σ is consistent,
then there is a model M such that M  A for all A ∈ Σ. 
Theorem 10.7 If A does not contain t, nor any subformula of the form NB
unless B is atomic, then CN ` A iff CNN ` t→ A.
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Proof. Given 10.6, CNN ` t→ A iff 1 A.
For any M , the function h over the atomic formulae of CN such that:
h(p) = 1 iff M 1 p and h(Np) = 1 iff M 1 Np
is clearly a truth assignment satisfying item 4 of 2.1, and moreover by an easy
induction on A, M 1 A implies h  A (as h  . . . is characterised in 2.1).
On the other hand, if h is a truth assignment according to 2.1, define v –
and so M – as follows:
v(p) =
 {1, 2} if h(p) = 1∅ if h(Np) = 1{2} otherwise
(note that the same numbers have different functions here: the 1 of the assertion
h(p) = 1 acts as a propositional truth value of 2.1; the 1 of the assertion v(p) =
{1, 2} acts as a possible world). An easy induction on A verifies that h  A
implies M 1 A.
Therefore, there is an h such that h  A iff there is an M such that M 1 A.
It follows from this that CN ` A iff CNN ` t→ A. 
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